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Ambivalence is defined as the state of simultaneously experiencing antithetical emotions towards 
a single attitude object (Bleuler, 1911/1950). Recent studies have evidenced ambivalence as a 
prominent aspect of schizophrenia patients’ in-the-moment emotional experiences (Cohen & 
Minor, 2010; Trémeau et al., 2009). The present study extended this line of work through the use 
of an experimental mood-induction methodology to explore the amount, frequency, and average 
duration of univalent positive, negative, and ambivalent emotional episodes within individuals 
with schizophrenia and those without psychiatric disturbance. The results indicate that, when 
exposed to a film clip stimulus selected for its documented (Larsen & McGraw, 2011) capacity 
to induce ambivalent emotions, individuals with and without schizophrenia do not reliably differ 
in any measured dimension of univalent or ambivalent emotional experience. Potential 
explanations for observed inconsistencies in the schizophrenia emotional experience literature 
are reviewed and study limitations as well as directions for future research are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 In the same seminal text in which he coined the term schizophrenia to describe what he 
viewed as the resultant syndrome of a fundamental split (‘schizein’) in the mind (‘phren’), Eugen 
Bleuler (1911/1950) defined ‘ambivalence’ as the phenomenon of simultaneously experiencing 
diametrically valenced feelings (e.g., happiness and sadness) towards a single stimulus or object. 
Beyond merely introducing a novel term however, Bleuler posited ambivalence as one of the 
four cardinal symptoms of the disorder along with autism, the loosening of associations, and 
inappropriate affect. Unfortunately, despite the fact that ambivalence has continued to occupy a 
prominent role within Bleuler’s and, more recently, others’ (e.g., Meehl, 1962), theories of 
schizophrenia, several issues have either deterred or obscured empirical efforts to elucidate this 
phenomenon. First, over time, the concept has been used in an array of contexts to describe a 
variety of pathological as well as nonpathological mental states (Sincoff, 1990). These 
appropriations, however valid, have collectively served to stretch the semantic boundaries of the 
concept such that some argue the term has failed to hold a precise definition (Raulin & Brenner, 
1993). And second, a host of methodological difficulties and ensuing debates have ensnared 
previous attempts to document ambivalence as a scientific construct generally (Schimmack & 
Colcombe, 1999) and symptom of the schizophrenia spectrum specifically (Raulin, 1984). As 
with most scientific progressions however, careful conceptual demarcations and technical 
advancements have enabled researchers to begin to investigate the validity of ambivalence in 
describing schizophrenic symptomatology. Continuing in this regard, the aim of this project was 
to examine whether individuals with schizophrenia report experiencing more ambivalence in 
response to a putatively ambivalent film clip than do those without a history of psychiatric 
diagnosis. 
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 In order to contextualize this project within the larger body of research on the symptoms 
of schizophrenia, an overview of several pertinent literatures is provided in the first half of this 
document. First, current conceptualizations and derivative nosological systems used to identify 
schizophrenia and its associated features are reviewed; as are those systems used to organize the 
invariably heterogeneous symptom presentations of individuals diagnosed with the disorder. 
Next, a brief review of the research on emotion in schizophrenia and the overarching paradigms 
used to investigate this topic, as well as the problems contained therein, is provided followed by 
an exposition of research specifically documenting emotional experience in schizophrenia. Then, 
the concept of ambivalence and the experimental model used in its documentation – the 
Evaluative Space Model (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; 
Larsen, Norris, McGraw, Hawkley, & Cacioppo, 2009) – are evaluated with regards to their 
potential for providing clarification and insights into the aberrant emotional experiences of those 
with schizophrenia. Following this review of the literature, the aims, hypotheses, and methods of 
the present study are discussed and a description of the data analytic strategy as well as 
associated power analysis is provided. In turn, the results of the conducted analyses are provided 
and the document concludes with a full synthesis of the study findings and implications in the 
discussion section. 
1.1 Schizophrenia 
 Classified as a psychotic disorder within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders 4th Edition – Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, APA, 
2000), schizophrenia represents a debilitating disturbance in thought, emotion, and behavior. 
More specifically, the diagnosis of schizophrenia is indicated in cases in which at least two of the 
core symptoms – delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, catatonic or disorganized 
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behavior, and/or negative symptoms (i.e., alogia, blunt affect, avolition) – are present for one 
month with enduring signs of disturbance lasting for at least six months (e.g., enduring negative 
symptoms). The lifetime prevalence estimates of schizophrenia range from 0.5 to 1.5% (APA, 
2000; Perala et al., 2007) however these figures belie the tremendous burden schizophrenia 
imposes on society given that the combined direct (e.g., hospitalization expenses) and indirect 
(e.g., lost productivity due to morbidity and/or premature mortality) costs associated with the 
illness are estimated at nearly $65 billion per year within the United States alone; a prohibitive 
expenditure that is replicated internationally (Knapp, Mangalore, & Simon, 2004). 
 Notwithstanding the significant societal impact of the disease, schizophrenia can also 
have a devastating effect on the lives of those diagnosed, with illness onset usually occurring 
between the ages of 18 and 25 in men and 18 and 30 in women (Angermeyer & Kuhnz, 1988; 
Hafner, 1998). Otherwise put, the onset of schizophrenia ordinarily coincides with, and thus may 
serve as impediment to, a transitional period in life during which individuals typically must 
navigate crucial educational and vocational junctures. In addition, although there is substantial 
variability in clinical course and prognoses may be less malignant than previously believed 
(Harrison et al., 2001; Hegarty, Baldessarini, Tohen, Waternaux, & Oepen, 1994; Jobe & 
Harrow, 2005), outcome in schizophrenia is, nevertheless, often typified by significant declines 
in several domains of functioning (e.g., Eack & Newhill, 2007; Folsom et al., 2005). 
Taken together, it is clear that schizophrenia exacts significant societal as well as 
personal and familial costs. It is little wonder, therefore, that an expansive research effort has 
endeavored to uncover the mechanisms by which the onset of this disease is triggered. 
Collectively, this body of research has buttressed the diathesis-stress model of schizophrenia 
such that there is widespread agreement that the emergence of schizophrenia is the result of a 
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complex interaction between genetic, epigenetic, and environmental variables (e.g., Harrison & 
Weinberger, 2005; Lenzenweger, 2006; Maki et al., 2005; Norman & Malla, 1993; Petronis, 
2004, Tandon, Keshavan, & Nasrallah, 2008). In spite of this consensus however, isolating 
proximate causes has proven difficult as it remains the case that a host of factors, such as 
substance use and life stress (e.g., Butzlaff & Hooley, 1998; Corcoran et al., 2003; Phillips et al., 
2006), can precipitate initial psychotic episodes although none of these triggers are present in all 
incidences of the disorder. Indeed, the etiological and developmental diversity uncovered by this 
research enterprise appears to mirror the considerable symptomatological heterogeneity observed 
both within and between diagnosed individuals, as is discussed next. 
1.2 Heterogeneous Symptomatology within Schizophrenia 
 As a formal diagnosis, schizophrenia consists of an admixture of positive (i.e., abnormal 
behavioral excesses; e.g., delusions, hallucinations), negative (e.g., alogia, avolition), and 
disorganized (e.g., thought disorder) symptoms nuanced by an assortment of associated 
cognitive, affective, and psychomotor features (APA, 2000; Tandon, Nasrallah, Keshavan, 
2009). However, although the DSM-IV-TR presents well-articulated descriptions and 
demarcations of these symptoms, with the possible exception of nonspecific cognitive deficits 
(Heinrichs, 2005), there are no symptoms of schizophrenia that hold across all cases of the 
disorder (Cohen & Docherty, 2005); nor are there any endogenous signatures (e.g., 
neuroanatomical deformity, pathophysiological process) that may serve as pathognomonic 
indicators of the disease (Keshavan, Tandon, Boutros, & Nasrallah, 2008). Furthermore, phasic 
shifts in clinical presentations are common (e.g., florid psychotic symptoms resolve and are 
replaced by more chronic negative symptoms) thereby adding within-subject variability to the 
already palpable between-subject symptomatological variance.  
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To the extent that such diversity perturbs research into specific psychopathological 
processes and identifying illness trajectories, many investigators have come to construe 
‘schizophrenia’ as a general label for an array of related disorders rather than a single, unified 
disease entity (e.g., Tandon et al., 2009). Using a more pragmatic approach, other researchers 
have developed different symptom taxonomies in order to create more homogenous subsets of 
patients. One of such nosological systems is the one employed in the DSM-IV-TR in which 
diagnoses are partitioned into paranoid, disorganized, catatonic, undifferentiated, and residual 
subtypes (APA, 2000). In light of the limited clinical and prognostic utility of these subtypes 
(e.g., Fenton & McGlashan, 1991; Regier, 2007; Suvisaari et al., 2009), however, more 
empirically derived systems – the syndrome and symptom-oriented approaches – have gained 
favor in both research and clinical contexts. 
 The syndrome approach employs several statistical techniques, notably factor analysis of 
symptom ratings, to identify those symptoms that frequently co-occur and thus aggregate into 
distinctive clusters. Although parsimonious, evidence suggests that dichotomous schemes such 
as the positive versus negative (Andreasen & Olsen, 1982), Kraepelinian versus non-
Kraepelinian (Keefe et al., 1988), and deficit versus non-deficit (Carpenter, Heinrichs, & Alphs, 
1988) models demonstrate inadequate fit with the data concerning the multifarious clinical 
expressions of schizophrenia (e.g., Arndt, Alliger, & Andreasen, 1991). A more replicable and 
thus valid alternative categorizes schizophrenic pathology into three symptom complexes. That 
is, positive (i.e., delusions and hallucinations), negative (i.e., avolition, alogia, anhedonia, and 
flat affect), and disorganization (i.e., catatonia, inappropriate affect, and disorganized speech) 
syndromes (Buchanan & Carpenter, 1994; Grube, Bilder, & Goldman, 1998; Toomey, Faraone, 
Simpson, & Tsuang, 1998).  
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In lieu of identifying dissociable symptom clusters or syndromes, as the name suggests, 
the symptom-oriented approach reduces schizophrenic symptomatology to the level of 
independent indications of disturbance (i.e., individual symptoms). Perhaps the foremost benefit 
of this descriptive framework is that it largely bypasses the inherent difficulties of attempting to 
establish a reliable and valid nomenclature (i.e., categories and/or dimensions) of schizophrenia 
symptomatology (Costello, 1992). Regardless of whether one applies a syndrome or symptom-
oriented approach however, it can be argued that both frameworks have enabled researchers to 
begin to elucidate those features of schizophrenia that have traditionally received less empirical 
attention. That is, chiefly, the emotional symptoms of schizophrenia, which is the topic to which 
I now turn. 
1.3 The Affective Sciences and Emotion within Schizophrenia 
In spite of the early works of influential theorists Kraepelin (1919/1971), Bleuler 
(1911/1950), Sullivan (1927, 1962), and Meehl (1962, 1990), in which emotional symptoms 
were postulated as central and particularly deleterious features of the disorder, prior to the 
1990’s, emotion in schizophrenia was an understudied topic in comparison to some of the more 
popularized symptom domains (e.g., formal thought disorder, delusions, and hallucinations). 
More recently however, a wealth of research has integrated findings, theories, and methodologies 
from fields as diverse as the basic affective sciences, clinical and cognitive neurosciences, and 
experimental psychopathology to gain greater insights into the mechanisms and processes 
underlying the emotional lives of those afflicted by this disorder (see Kohler & Martin, 2006, 
Kring, 1999, Kring & Caponigro, 2010, Kring & Moran, 2008, and Trémeau, 2006, for review). 
Unfortunately, an outmoded lexicon, which only serves to further obfuscate the study of this 
already complex subject, has encumbered these advances. In particular, phrases such as 
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‘emotional deficits’ or ‘emotional dysfunctions’ are commonly used to denote one or more of the 
negative symptoms – flat affect (i.e., impoverished outward expression of emotion), avolition 
(i.e., reduced motivation), alogia (i.e., reduced speech or reduced content of speech), asociality 
(i.e., restricted social interests and contacts), and anhedonia (i.e., inability to experience 
pleasure). However, confusingly, these terms are not used in reference to other emotional 
features such as mood or anxiety symptoms per se. In other words, although highly comorbid 
(Potvin, Sepehry, & Stip, 2007) and possessing much phenotypic overlap with schizophrenic 
symptoms proper (e.g., Addington, Addington, & Maticka-Tyndale, 1993; Kitamura & Suga, 
1991), mood- and anxiety-related symptoms are nonspecific psychopathological features that are 
considered distinct from the core affective aspects of schizophrenia-spectrum illness. Equally 
confusing as this negation of mood and anxiety symptoms is that nebulous terms such as 
‘emotional abnormalities’ also do not typically refer to the emotional concomitants of psychotic 
symptoms (Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 2001; Nayani & David, 1996); indeed, the interaction 
of the different emotional symptoms of schizophrenia remains a sorely neglected area of 
research. Taken together, although all affective symptoms and sequelae involve disruptions in 
emotional and/or conative systems (Aleman & Kahn, 2005), mood, anxiety, and negative 
symptoms each involve different pathologies in different aspects of the emotion construct 
thereby rendering terms such as ‘emotional dysfunctions’ or ‘affective abnormalities’ sufficiently 
ambiguous if not unintelligible.  
In order to more fully understand the requisite conceptual distinctions incumbent on any 
terminology used in the study of emotion in schizophrenia, it is important to introduce some 
foundational issues inherent to basic emotion research. Generally speaking, ‘emotion’ as a 
scientific construct has been plagued by an enduring lack of consensus with regards to both its 
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definitional expanse and parameters (e.g., Izard, 2010). For example, there is little agreement as 
to whether the terms “affect” and “emotion” are synonyms or, instead, reflect conceptually 
distinct phenomena with the former denoting (a) emotive behavioral displays or (b) subjective 
‘feeling states’ and the latter denoting complex cognitive, psychophysiological events (Widen & 
Russell, 2010; see also Alpert & Rosen, 1990). Related to this issue, there have also been myriad 
attempts to identify the composite dimensions of the emotion construct (Frijda, 1986). For 
instance, within the basic emotion literature, ‘emotion’ has been differentially deconstructed into 
several domains including (but not limited to) emotion recognition, antecedent events and 
stimuli, cognitive appraisals, expressions and behaviors, physiologic changes, emotional 
experiences, motivational changes, consequent changes in cognitive functioning and belief 
systems, and self-regulatory processes. In addition, each of these domains have been further 
deconstructed into constituent subdomains – for example, the various physiological (e.g., 
electrodermal, cardiovascular, and electromyographic) dimensions which researchers use to 
monitor the visceral correlates of emotional reactions. Clearly, these complex and divergent 
depictions incite debate and discord however, although there is no consensus as to which, or how 
many, domains should be considered with regards to the structure of ‘emotion’, all researchers 
converge on the construct’s invariably multifaceted nature (Izard, 2010; Scherer, 1984).  
It is doubtful that the study of emotion in schizophrenia, in and of itself, will resolve any 
of the definitional issues endemic to the field of basic emotion research. Nevertheless, the 
investigation of circumscribed phenomena – namely, that of emotion recognition and emotional 
responses – has enabled significant progress. Emotion recognition, or emotion perception, 
encompasses strictly interpersonal (i.e., social cognitive) phenomena such as, for example, 
individuals’ ability to discern another’s facially expressed emotions and decode others’ 
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behaviorally conveyed cues (see Edwards, Jackson, & Pattison, 2002, for review). Here, patients 
with schizophrenia, relative to both healthy and clinical controls, consistently demonstrate 
significant impairment in recognizing as well as discriminating between facially expressed 
emotions (e.g., Kohler & Martin, 2006). Furthermore, several studies indicate that this 
impairment is not confined to a mere prosopagnosia as individuals with schizophrenia also show 
marked impairment in prosodic recognition and discrimination (Hoekert, Kahn, Pijnenborg, & 
Aleman, 2007). Whether these multimodal impairments in processing emotional stimuli 
represent a specific impairment within schizophrenia or, alternatively, are indicative of the more 
general neurocognitive defect characteristic of the disorder (Dickinson, Ragland, Gold, & Gur, 
2008) remains to be seen. However, regardless of specificity, it is clear that this aspect of the 
emotion construct is significantly affected within those with schizophrenia. 
In comparison to emotion recognition, emotional responses often involve more 
intrapersonal phenomena that do not necessarily, although often do, involve the processing and 
encoding of social stimuli. More specifically, emotional responses, as defined in the 
schizophrenia literature, are comprised of at least three components: (1) expressions, (2) 
physiologic responses, and (3) experiences (Kring & Moran, 2008). In turn, each of these 
components can be further broken down into subcomponents for study within individuals with 
schizophrenia. Regardless of the number of dimensions or sub-dimensions investigated however, 
and it is noteworthy that many investigations study more than one dimension of emotional 
responding at the same time, one of the foremost challenges to integrating findings across 
components of emotional responding is that the different components are typically only modestly 
correlated (Alpert & Rosen, 1990) and often entirely discordant (e.g., Kring, Kerr, Smith, & 
Neale, 1993; Kring & Moran, 2008). Consequently, efforts to identify holistic emotional 
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responding in schizophrenia are confounded by inconsistences across measures thereby leaving 
open the question of which component(s) most accurately reflects individuals’ emotional 
reactions to various stimuli. Nevertheless, rather than resolving this quandary per se, some 
researchers have circumnavigated this issue by proposing the fragmentation of emotional 
responding as a central aspect of schizophrenic pathology rather than mere methodological 
nuisance (e.g., Sass, 2007).  
As evidenced by issues such as those stated above, the three-component model of 
emotional responses may be, and almost certainly is, fraught with inaccuracies and deficiencies. 
This does not remove that fact however that the model has nonetheless proven to be an 
invaluable heuristic in the study of emotion in schizophrenia. Explicitly, the first component of 
emotional responses – emotional expression – has been stratified into behavioral and verbal (i.e., 
acoustic and lexical) channels and a large number of studies have shown that individuals with 
schizophrenia are significantly less facially as well as vocally expressive than those without a 
diagnosis. In particular, using both standardized procedures for coding facial emotions (e.g., 
Kring & Sloan, 2007) as well as psychophysiological measures of somatic activity, patients with 
schizophrenia, in comparison to healthy controls as well as a variety of neurologically impaired 
patients, enact fewer observable gestures and facial expressions in response to a wide array of 
evocative stimuli (e.g., Berenbaum & Oltmanns, 1992; Kring et al., 1993; Kring & Neale, 1996). 
As well, apart from the restricted verbal output indicative of alogia, the speech of those with 
schizophrenia (e.g., Murphy & Cutting, 1990; Ross et al., 2001) and other schizophrenia-
spectrum illnesses (Cohen, Iglesias, & Minor, 2009) is often marked by significantly reduced 
variability in acoustic variables which, together, serve the paralinguistic function of 
communicating speaker emotional states and intentions. Although this affective flattening or 
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blunting has long been documented using clinician ratings and interviews (e.g., Andreasen, 
1979), by using more behaviorally-based methodologies, these studies confirm constricted 
emotional expression as a core feature of schizophrenia. Moreover, a further important aspect of 
this research is that several studies (e.g., Kring et al., 1993; Kring & Earnst, 1999) observed the 
reductions in emotional expressivity in neuroleptic and otherwise psychotropic naïve patients 
which thereby rules out these deficits as artifactual or iatrogenic byproducts of pharmacotherapy. 
The second component of emotional responses – physiological responses – has been the 
subject of several elicitation investigations. That is, for example, studies in which 
psychophysiology equipment is used to log individuals’ autonomic responses to emotionally 
evocative stimuli (e.g., still pictures, film clips). Unlike the abovementioned evidence for 
expressive deficits however, the evidence for physiological irregularities within schizophrenia is 
considerably more variable. With regards to electrodermal reactivity, some studies (e.g., Kring & 
Neale, 1996) report evidence of increased skin conductance responses within those with 
schizophrenia whereas others (e.g., Hempel et al., 2005; Volz, Hamm, Kirsch, & Rey, 2003) 
report no differences in skin conductance responses between those with and without the disorder. 
Additionally, still others (e.g., Schlenker, Cohen, & Hopmann, 1995) report attenuated skin 
conductance responses within individuals with schizophrenia. Cardiovascular reactivity is 
another dimension along which aberrant responding in schizophrenia has been investigated. 
Again, while some studies report differences between those with and without a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (e.g., Hempel et al., 2005; Hempel, Tulen, van Beveren, Mulder, Hengeveld, 
2007), others do not (e.g., Schlenker et al., 1995). Electromyography, and more specifically 
facial muscle reactivity, is a yet further dimension of physiological responding that researchers 
have investigated for evidence of deviation in those with schizophrenia. Although, as noted 
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above, those with schizophrenia are generally less expressive than their healthy counterparts, 
several studies (e.g., Earnst, Kring, Kadar, Salem, & Shepard, 1996; Mattes, Schneider, 
Heimann, & Birbaumer, 1995) find evidence that patients nonetheless enact microexpressions. 
That is, subtle, unobservable muscle twitches that serve as precursors to perceptible facial 
expressions. As is consistent with the other facets of psychophysiological responding, evidence 
for group differences in microexpressive displays is mixed insofar as some studies (e.g., Kring, 
Kerr, & Earnst, 1999) report amounts of facial muscle responses in patients comparable to 
healthy controls whereas others report either lesser (e.g., Wolf, Mass, Kiefer, Wiedemann, & 
Naber, 2006) or more (Wolf et al., 2004) activity in the underlying facial musculature (e.g., 
zygomaticus major and corrugator supercilium) of individuals with schizophrenia. In summation, 
although the convoluted and at times conflicting findings are difficult to synthesize, 
physiological emotional responding appears to be largely intact for many diagnosed individuals. 
That is, many patients demonstrate expected patterns of autonomic activity that are consistent 
with the valence of presented stimuli thereby making their resultant psychophysiological profiles 
difficult to distinguish from those without a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Still, much work remains 
to be done before claims of unimpaired psychophysiological functioning in schizophrenia can be 
made with any degree of certainty and thus before determining whether this component of 
emotional responding stands in contrast to the other debilitating emotional features of the 
disorder, including, as is discussed next, abnormalities in the third component of emotional 
responses – emotional experience. 
1.4 Abnormal Emotional Experience within Schizophrenia 
 On the basis of their blunted and oftentimes vacant emotional expressions, it is easy to 
envision the emotional experiences of those with schizophrenia as commensurately dull. That is, 
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lives filled with pallid and highly mechanical experiences which are devoid of the cognitive and 
physiological accompaniments (e.g., state dependent thoughts and arousal levels) that typically 
furnish the phenomenology or feeling states of undiagnosed individuals. Indeed, this depiction is 
largely consistent with Kraepelin (1919/1971) who spoke of an “ataxia of the feelings” (p. 32) in 
referencing the absence of emotional experiences in schizophrenia when he first described the 
disorder. First blush impressions, with or without historical precedent, and the results of 
empirical investigations are often at odds however, and one robust finding to emerge over the 
past two decades is that those with schizophrenia often report experiencing potent emotions, and 
often to a greater extent and more frequently than their undiagnosed counterparts (e.g., Kring & 
Moran, 2008; Myin-Gerymeys, Delespaul, & Devries, 2000). 
To illustrate, clinician-administered symptom rating scales are often employed in 
assessment and treatment planning contexts, and often with the aim of documenting the 
behavioral or affective flattening of schizophrenia. However, in the face of this blunted affect, 
studies using standardized clinical instruments such as the Scale for the Assessment of Negative 
Symptoms (SANS; Andreasen, 1989) or Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; Overall & 
Gorham, 1962; Lukoff, Nuechterlein, & Ventura, 1986) have at the same time also unveiled the 
active emotional experiences of patients. That is, several of these studies report pathologically 
elevated anhedonia (although see below for further discussion) and negative emotions (e.g., 
anxiety, guilt, hostility) within those with schizophrenia relative to healthy controls (e.g., 
Aghevli, Blanchard, & Horan, 2003; Mueser, Curran, & McHugo, 1997). In line with these 
findings, other research using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (i.e., MMPI-A) 
and other self-report personality inventories have also found that individuals with schizophrenia 
routinely report increased levels of negative emotional traits and diminished levels of positive 
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emotional traits (Blanchard, Mueser, & Bellack, 1998; Horan, Subotnik, Reise, Ventura, & 
Nuechterlein, 2005). Naturalistic studies, such as those using the Experience Sampling Method 
wherein patients are prompted at various intervals throughout the day to disclose their thoughts, 
behaviors, and feelings, have also evidenced patients’ active emotional experiences. More 
specifically, several studies using this method have shown that those with schizophrenia, in 
comparison to controls, report a greater range and intensity of negative emotions relative to 
positive emotions (e.g., DeVries & Delespaul, 1989; Myin-Germeys et al., 2003). 
Given the complexity of the emotional experience construct, an array of methodologies – 
including the abovementioned symptom ratings scales and client self-report questionnaires – 
were necessary in order to contribute the finding of the conspicuous disjunction between many 
patients’ outer (i.e., expressive) and inner (i.e., experiential) domains of emotional functioning. 
These methods continue to be used in order to illuminate patients’ phenomenological 
experiences of emotion and, more specifically, to address the difficulties of providing accurate 
descriptive accounts of these experiences beyond simply asserting that those with schizophrenia 
experience emotion. Otherwise put, on the basis of the heretofore reviewed studies, it is clear that 
individuals with schizophrenia lead active emotional lives with panoramic emotional 
experiences; the nature of these experiences however, although assumed to be out and out 
pathological (i.e., depicted by general increases in negative and decreases in positive emotional 
states; Meehl, 1962; 1990; Rado, 1953), is a more contentious issue. 
One obstacle to documenting the nature of emotional experience in schizophrenia is 
purely methodological. That is, a salient constancy between the commonly used methods of 
symptom rating scales and questionnaires is that they are largely, if not entirely, reliant on the 
self-reports of clients. Apart from the subjectivities and inaccuracies typical of autobiographical 
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recall (e.g., Hyman & Loftus, 1998), as well as the distorting effects of other influences (e.g., 
dissimulation; Furnham, 1986), the well-documented cognitive impairments of schizophrenia 
have led many to question whether those with the disorder are capable of producing reliable and 
valid reports of their emotional experiences (e.g., Jaeger, Bitter, Czobor, & Volavka, 1990). 
Further confounding this prospect is that many individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate 
impairments in illness insight (Carroll et al., 1999; Mintz, Dobson, & Romney, 2003) and are 
thus thought to be unable to reflect upon their emotional experiences. Moreover, many 
individuals with schizophrenia exhibit elevated levels of alexithymia (i.e., a personality construct 
literally meaning “no words for feelings” and representing pathological reductions in 
experiencing, identifying, and describing emotions) as well as communication disturbances (e.g., 
Docherty & Gordinier, 1999) which, taken together, inhibit patients’ abilities to verbally 
articulate their experiences of the socio-emotional milieu within which they live.  
Still, despite the fact that these symptoms, and especially the cognitive deficits of 
schizophrenia, are ubiquitous and particularly debilitating features of the disorder, as well as the 
fact that as much as 50-80% of patients are unaware that they suffer from a psychotic disorder 
and are further unaware of the symptoms and requisite treatment for the disorder (Amador & 
Gorman, 1998), several studies serve to refute the notion that the self-reported emotional 
experiences of individuals with schizophrenia are categorically invalid. First, a study by Kring, 
Barrett, and Gard (2003) found that individuals with schizophrenia and healthy controls share 
similar cognitive representations of emotional phenomena. That is, both individuals with and 
without a diagnosis of schizophrenia accessed two dimensional valence-arousal schemas when 
giving similarity ratings of emotion words (e.g., nervous, fearful, aroused). Accordingly, to the 
extent that the underlying semantic structures of patients’ and nonpatients’ affective verbiage 
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was largely isomorphic, the results of this study support the contention that individuals with 
schizophrenia are capable of giving at least comparably valid self-reports of their emotional 
experiences. Second, a collection of longitudinal investigations (e.g., Blanchard et al., 1998; 
Kring & Earnst, 1999) have measured patients’ self-reports of emotional experience and have 
demonstrated that such measures possess high internal consistency as well as test-retest 
reliability. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, several of these studies have demonstrated 
the appreciable reliability of patients’ self-reported emotional experiences over within-subject 
changes in symptom presentations and medication regimens thereby providing incremental 
evidence that patients’ self-reports of emotional experiences are robust to at least some 
symptomatological factors as well as to the psychological side effects of pharmacotherapy 
(Kring & Earnst, 1999; Kring & Neal, 1996). Lastly, several authors have argued that, although 
scientific skepticism of the methods and sources from which data are collected is an 
indispensable aspect of all research enterprises, the unbridled mistrust of the self-reported 
emotional experiences of individuals with schizophrenia remains mostly speculative and 
unfounded by extant research, especially in light of the fact that basal functioning and other 
inclusionary criteria (e.g., Global Assessment of Functioning scores, APA, 2000) are 
commonplace elements of most research designs (Strauss, 1994). Furthermore, taken in its 
extreme form, some researchers have suggested that such skepticism is nonspecific to 
schizophrenia and is indeed applicable to a host of psychiatric disorders (Kessler, Wittchen, 
Abelson, & Zhao, 2000) and therefore amounts to nothing more than tacit discrimination and 
perpetual stigmatization of those with severe mental illness (Kring & Caponigro, 2010). 
Altogether, it is clear that the cognitive deficits, communicative disturbances, and lack of 
illness insight characteristic of many individuals with schizophrenia present significant 
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misgivings with regards to the veracity of patients’ self-reported emotional experiences. In turn, 
these concerns confound the investigation as to the phenomenological nature of schizophrenia 
patients’ emotional experiences. Nonetheless, insofar as previous research has demonstrated that 
individuals with schizophrenia are capable of yielding highly reliable self-reports of emotional 
experience and hold the same knowledge structures of emotion as undiagnosed individuals, the 
subjective reports of patients’ emotional experiences by way of self-report instruments possess 
sufficient content and construct validity to enable meaningful inter-group comparisons. 
Apart from the debate regarding the appropriateness of the self-report methodologies, a 
further obstacle to describing the nature of emotional experience in schizophrenia is that studies 
that employ these techniques offer conflicting results that prohibit unilateral characterizations of 
the abnormalities of patients’ emotional phenomenology. Otherwise put, findings from these 
studies present a perplexing inconsistency between schizophrenia patients’ state versus trait 
reports of experienced emotions such that the nature of these reports appears to vary as a 
function of whether patients’ responses are given in-the-moment in reaction to controlled 
laboratory stimuli or, alternatively, given to reflect patients’ own perceptions of their general 
affective dispositions irrespective of specific contexts. Explicitly, as previously detailed, 
numerous studies employing self-report questionnaires such as the MMPI (e.g., Horan et al., 
2005), Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (e.g., Blanchard et al., 1998), and Chapman 
Anhedonia Scales (Horan, Kring, & Blanchard, 2006) as well as studies which employ 
interviewer-based symptom rating scales such as the SANS (Aghevli et al., 2003), BRPS 
(Mueser et al., 1997), and Positive and Negative Syndrome Scales (Kay, Opler, & Lindenmayer, 
1988), generally report diminished positive emotions (i.e., anhedonia) in conjunction with 
elevated levels of negative emotions (e.g., sadness, guilt) in those with schizophrenia relative to 
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nonpatient controls. By contrast, most mood-induction studies wherein emotionally evocative 
stimuli (e.g., picture stills, film clips) are presented within highly controlled experimental 
settings generally do not find significant differences between those with and without 
schizophrenia in emotional responses to negative, positive, as well as neutral stimuli (Kring & 
Moran, 2008). Put plainly, relative to nonpatient controls, most studies using self-report or 
symptom rating instruments depict the emotional experience of individuals with schizophrenia as 
anhedonic with surpluses of negative emotion whereas many studies using mood-induction 
methodologies depict the emotional experience of individuals with schizophrenia as relatively 
normal without significant group-level differences in either positive or negative emotions. 
Several theories have been put forth in an effort to explain the inconsistency between 
patients’ trait and state self-reported emotional experiences (see Cohen, Najolia, Brown, & 
Minor, 2011, for review). First, the construct validity of self-report and symptom rating scales 
have been questioned on the grounds that they are thought to tap overly-simplistic, partial, or 
otherwise divergent conceptions of the anhedonia construct (e.g., Dworkin, 1992; Germans & 
Kring, 2000; Leventhal, Chasson, Tapia, Miller, & Pettit, 2006). According to this theory, then, 
to the extent that commonly used self-report or interview-based scales measure phenomena other 
than hedonic emotional experience per se (e.g., social-skills deficits), emotional experience 
within schizophrenia is that which is measured during laboratory mood-induction studies – that 
is, largely without pathology. A second theory has accrued a larger body of research and 
postulates that hedonic experience consists of two dissociable components – anticipatory and 
consummatory pleasure experience – and that it is only the first of these components that is 
impaired within schizophrenia (Gard, Kring, Gard, Horan, & Green, 2007; Kring, 1999). In 
essence, this theory states that those with schizophrenia exhibit a severe defect in anticipating 
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future pleasurable experiences as well as deriving pleasure from such anticipations and therefore 
decline experiencing positive emotions when not directly perceiving and processing pleasant 
stimuli. When in the presence of such stimuli however, according to this theory, those with 
schizophrenia have intact hedonic capacity and thus have emotional experiences that are 
phenomenologically indistinguishable from those without a diagnosis. The neurocognitive 
mechanisms, and pathologies therein, discussed by anticipatory-consummatory theorists largely 
overlap with those considered in two further theories of the state-trait disjunction in 
schizophrenia patients’ self-reported emotional experience. In particular, several researchers 
(e.g., Burbridge & Barch, 2007; Horan, Green, Kring, & Nuechterlein, 2006) posit that the 
cognitive deficits of schizophrenia pervade and obscure patients’ self-reports of emotional 
experience in that, for example, specific deficits in working and episodic memory inhibit 
patients’ abilities to effectively encode and pair autobiographical episodes with pleasant feelings. 
In turn, having never successfully associated stimulus (i.e., event) and response (i.e., pleasure) to 
begin with, according to proponents of encoding-retrieval and representational deficit theories, 
individuals with schizophrenia fail to store and retrieve memories of pleasurable experiences 
when responding to self-report and interview-based measures however demonstrate intact 
emotional experience in the presence of evocative stimuli.  
Before concluding that in-the-moment emotional experience is entirely without 
abnormality in schizophrenia, it is worth noting several key conceptual and methodological 
distinctions that are necessary in order fully evaluate the complex construct of emotional 
experience as it is manifested in controlled mood-induction investigations. Firstly, there is an 
ostensive difference between asking experimental participants to rate their feelings in reaction to 
evocative stimuli versus asking participants to rate the affective properties of the stimulus itself – 
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a distinction that is borne out in neuroimaging research as much as it is in behavioral 
investigations. For example, although activation of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is 
involved in the processing of emotion generally (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002), the 
rating of feeling states recruits more dorsal-rostral areas of the mPFC and coincides with 
activation of homeostatic regions such as the secondary somatosensory cortex, cingulate, and 
hypothalamic and tegmental nuclei (Damasio et al., 2000). By comparison, rating the affective 
qualities of stimuli recruits more ventral areas of the mPFC and coincides with activation of 
‘cognitive control’ regions such as the anterior cingulate and insula (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; 
Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). Despite these neuroanatomical differences, across both 
types of studies, similar results emerge in that individuals with schizophrenia tend to report 
emotional experiences consistent with the valence of the evocative stimuli which thereby lends 
credence to the apparently normal, or at least non-disordered, in-the-moment emotional 
experience of patients. Importantly however, there are also observable stimulus-specific effects 
and inconsistencies that emerge from these literatures which point to a second conceptual and 
methodological distinction necessary in order to elucidate the nature of emotional experience in 
schizophrenia. 
As noted in a recent review of emotion in schizophrenia (Kring & Moran, 2008), and 
consistent with the abovementioned state-trait paradox, over half of all reviewed emotional 
experience studies reported evidence of comparable in-the-moment self-reports between 
schizophrenia patients and nonpatient controls. On the other hand however, it is also the case that 
a full quarter of such studies reported diminished positive emotion (i.e., anhedonia) in those with 
schizophrenia and a further fifth of studies reported intact or non-diminished positive emotion 
with increased negative emotions within those with schizophrenia. Moreover, apparently 
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documenting a subset of patients with the ‘deficit syndrome’ (Carpenter et al., 1988), a collection 
of studies report pathological decreases in both positive and negative emotional experiences in 
those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (e.g., Kirkpatrick & Buchanan, 1990; Kirkpatrick et al., 
1996; Horan & Blanchard, 2003). It is important to note that many of the studies evidencing 
abnormal emotional experiences in schizophrenia include those in which the experience 
sampling method was used – a methodology which many researchers (e.g., Bolger, Davis, & 
Rafaeli, 2003; Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1992; Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003) argue 
offers a more ecologically valid and therefore meaningful indication of patients’ real-time 
experiences. For example, avoiding the use of putatively artificial laboratory stimuli, Myin-
Germeys and colleagues (2003) reported that, over the course of six days and relative to healthy 
controls, individuals with schizophrenia experienced overall less positive emotion and more 
negative emotion in reaction to daily life stressors (e.g., social activities, vocational tasks).  
Taken together, although these studies disagree as to the direction and extent of deviant 
emotional experiences in schizophrenia (i.e., whether positive and negative emotional states 
occur with greater, similar, or lesser frequencies, durations, and intensities), all point to the 
imperative conceptual and methodological demarcation of positively- and negatively-valenced 
emotions in investigations of this topic. In fact, it was the implementation of self-report methods 
which explicitly delineate positive (e.g., happiness) and negative (e.g., sadness) emotions that 
lend support to an emerging theory of emotional experience in schizophrenia – ambivalence – 
which is both central to Bleuler’s (1911/1950) original theory of schizophrenia as well as the 




1.5 Ambivalence and the Evaluative Space Model 
 Bleuler (1911/1950) defined ambivalence as the “tendency to endow the most diverse 
psychisms with both a positive and negative indicator at the same time” (p. 53). In more 
contemporary parlance, ambivalence represents a state of simultaneously experiencing 
antithetical feelings in reaction to a single or delimited set of stimuli. Prior to the 1990’s, 
conceptual obscurity and methodological limitations rendered ambivalence a scientifically 
inaccessible construct (Raulin & Brenner, 1993); however, several, more recent, developments in 
fields outside of the study of schizophrenia have now made the concept both empirically tenable 
as well as particularly attractive for offering insights into the in-the-moment emotional 
experience of patients. Specifically, in two seminal reports, Cacioppo and his colleagues 
(Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997) formulated and 
persuasively articulated the nuances and supporting evidence for the evaluative space model of 
emotional phenomena wherein positively- and negatively-valenced aspects of emotion are 
separable in both experience and measurement. That is, the evaluative space model treats 
emotional experiences as the dynamic composites of distinct positive and negative emotional 
substrates which, in turn, are underpin by equally distinct motivational systems. In other words, 
according to the evaluative space model, emotional experiences are the continually updated 
conscious products of the complex interactions of two orthogonal arousal systems. Perhaps of 
greatest importance, to the extent that these systems function independently of one another, the 
evaluative space model theoretically enables the possibility of ambivalent emotional experiences 
– operationally defined as the co-activation of both positive and negative emotional substrates. 
Apart from its theoretical cogency, there is a developing body of neuroanatomical and 
neurochemical research that bolsters the precepts of the evaluative space framework in that such 
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research has delineated structural and functional differences in underlying positive and negative 
affect neurocircuitry. For example, limbic structures including the amygdala and stria terminalis 
have been shown to be associated with negative emotional responses, notably fear conditioning 
(e.g., LeDoux, 2000), whereas mesolimbic structures including the nucleus accumbens and 
medial forebrain bundle have been shown to be involved in positive emotional responses, and 
notably in reward-seeking and pleasure (e.g., Berridge, 2000). As well, cortisol and epinephrine 
have been shown to be largely associated with negative emotionality and stress reactions 
whereas dopamine and the class of endorphins (i.e., opiods) have been shown to be associated 
with positive emotionality (e.g., Breedlove, Watson, & Rosenzweig, 2010). Despite its 
theoretical plausibility and emerging neurobiological support, however, it is notable that there is 
ongoing debate amongst emotion researchers as to the feasibility of genuine ambivalent 
emotional states. On the one side of this debate, researchers such as Russell and Carroll (1999) 
contend that valence is a fundamental aspect of emotional experience and, as such, cannot be 
split or otherwise reduced into more basic components. By extension, these investigators argue 
that individuals cannot concurrently experience both positive and negative emotions (i.e., 
ambivalence) because the two are, unchangeably, antagonistic halves to a single valence 
continuum (Russell, 2003). Encapsulating this view, Bain (1859; as cited in Larsen & McGraw, 
2011) asserted that positive and negative emotion are fundamentally incompatible such that, “the 
presence of one destroys the property of the other, as an acid neutralizes an alkali [i.e., base]” (p. 
1095). Ultimately, drawing parallels to the debate of divided attention in which there is dispute 
as to whether one is truly capable of attending to more than one stimulus at one time or whether 
one merely alternates between attentional foci at an expeditious rate (e.g., Schmidtke & Heuer, 
1997; Spelke, Hirst, & Neisser, 1976), researchers in this camp contend that seemingly 
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ambivalent emotional states are in fact the rapid oscillation between positive and negative 
emotional experiences. To this end, these researchers assert that individuals cannot and do not 
simultaneously experience positive and negative emotion but instead report doing so as a result 
of the averaging effects of autobiographical memory (i.e., episodic memories for extremely brief 
phenomenal intervals are summarized into more generic and/or semantic memory stores; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005).  
On the other side of this debate, and in line with the evaluative space model, other 
researchers contend that antithetical feelings are plausibly experienced concurrently. Several 
studies, for example, have found that individuals report experiencing both positive and negative 
emotions in reaction to pictorial stimuli (Schimmack, 2005), particular musical pieces (Hunter, 
Schellenberg, & Schimmack, 2008), and, especially, major life transitions such as college 
graduation or residential relocations (Ersner-Hershfield, Mikels, Sullivan, & Carstensen, 2008). 
To the extent that the debate over emotional ambivalence is a debate regarding the conscious 
experience of emotions and is therefore often reliant on participants’ self-reports, it has been 
imperative for researchers endeavoring to evidence the veracity of ambivalence to rule out the 
confounding influences impinging on this method. First, at least two reports have documented 
ambivalent emotional responses in the face of explicitly controlling for demand characteristics 
and subject-expectancy effects (Larsen & McGraw, 2011; Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo 2001). 
Second, challenging the possibility that, in lieu of reporting their veridical emotional 
experiences, participants merely report the affective properties of experimental stimuli, one study 
found reports of ambivalent emotional experiences in reaction to exclusively negative stimuli 
(i.e., horror film clips; Andrade & Cohen, 2007). Lastly, as an important final piece of evidence 
supporting the viability of ambivalence, mixed emotion states have also been demonstrated 
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within laboratory settings in which continuous, as opposed to static, measures of emotional 
experience have been employed which thereby serves to contest the ‘rapid oscillation’ hypothesis 
(Larsen & McGraw, 2011). Put plainly, this latter research suggests that individuals do not 
simply vacillate between feeling positive and negative emotions but rather, in reaction to 
experimentally presented stimuli, experience the concomitant fusion of oppositional valences 
within a single phenomenal epoch. 
Taken together, the debate regarding ambivalence has many features emanating from the 
aforementioned systemic debate vis-à-vis the structure of emotions and therefore in all likelihood 
will not be resolved within the near future. Nevertheless, the theoretical possibility of 
ambivalence, and a corresponding methodology with which to measure it (see below), endowed 
by the evaluative space model permits investigation of a comparatively novel hypothesis of 
emotional experience in individuals generally as well as in those with schizophrenia specifically. 
Indeed, although most of the research conducted within the evaluative space paradigm has 
involved the study of nonclinical individuals, the concepts of ambivalence and independently 
operating positive and negative emotion subsystems map onto many of the heretofore-reviewed 
findings of emotional experience in schizophrenia and therefore may allow for greater insights 
into the emotional features of this illness. 
1.6 Ambivalence within Schizophrenia 
 As reviewed above, the literature regarding the nature of in-the-moment emotional 
experience within schizophrenia is fraught with non-linear effects if not outright contradictions 
and paradoxes. In view of the evaluative space model, it is possible, and perhaps likely, that 
many of these discrepant findings may in part stem from the use of methods which consider 
positive and negative emotions as mutually exclusive phenomena that exist along a single 
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approach-avoidance continuum and, consequently, preclude the documentation of ambivalent 
emotional responding. The results of a recent meta-analysis (Cohen & Minor, 2010) of 26 mood-
induction studies are particularly illuminating in this regard. Namely, studies employing bipolar 
(i.e., representing positive and negative emotions as poles to a single continuum) and those 
employing unipolar (i.e., separate positive and negative emotion) self-report scales were 
partitioned and the results of each analyzed separately. The analyses revealed that, in reaction to 
positively-valenced stimuli, studies using bipolar scales indicated significant “anhedonia” (i.e., 
less positive ratings) in schizophrenia patients relative to healthy controls whereas studies using 
separate positive and negative unipolar scales demonstrated comparable positive, but also 
significantly elevated negative, emotions in schizophrenia patients relative to controls. In 
addition, the results also showed that in reaction to both negatively-valenced and neutral stimuli, 
studies using bipolar scales tended to find no or negligible group differences in emotional self-
reports whereas those using distinct unipolar scales found moderate increases in positive 
emotions as well as modest to large increases in negative emotions in individuals with 
schizophrenia relative to controls.  
On the basis of these findings, then, it is conceivable that in-the-moment reports of 
anhedonia – that is, impoverished pleasure and positive emotion experiences – may actually 
reflect ambivalence. Here, it is important to discern two different conceptions of ambivalence, 
both of which are explicable within the framework of the evaluative space model (Cohen, Minor, 
& Najolia, 2010). On the one hand, as alluded to above, ambivalence may reflect the cross-
contamination of schizophrenia patients’ non-attenuated positivity by concurrently activated 
negative emotional states. On the other hand, rather than transient co-activations of negative and 
positive emotions, ambivalence in schizophrenia may represent an ever-present and 
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indiscriminate dysregulation of negative emotion. That is, consistent with the well-documented 
trait negative affect of the disorder (e.g., Horan et al., 2005), ambivalence in schizophrenia may 
be the result of a pernicious pathophysiological process whereby disinhibited negative emotion 
establishes a basal negativity within patients and thus positive emotional responses, as well as 
any emotional response, invariably occur against the backdrop of adversative emotional states. 
Regardless of which conceptualization is ultimately undergirded by research however, and to the 
extent that both descriptions are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may in fact be applicable 
at different stages of illness (e.g., first episode versus stabilized, chronic psychosis) and be 
moderated by a host of other psychopathological variables (e.g., comorbidity, substance use), the 
ultimate contention of the ambivalence hypothesis is that negative emotion imbues patients’ 
appraisals of evocative stimuli, irrespective of stimulus valence. 
At present, there has been only one experimental study in which the viability of 
ambivalence as a prime feature of schizophrenia patients’ emotional experience and 
symptomatology was evaluated. In particular, Trémeau et al. (2009) presented a group of 
schizophrenia patients and healthy controls with standardized sets of pictorial, aural, and lexical, 
stimuli across three valence (i.e., positive, negative, and neutral) conditions. Following stimulus 
presentations, participants were prompted to rate how pleasant, unpleasant, and arousing the 
respective stimuli were using Likert-style self-report scales. The results indicated that, relative to 
healthy controls, schizophrenia patients tended to report experiencing greater arousal across 
affective stimuli as well as overall greater ambivalence in the medium to large effect size range – 
that is, patients reported greater negative emotions in reaction to positive stimuli (d = 0.81) as 
well as greater positive emotion in reaction to negative stimuli (d = 0.50). Although providing 
preliminary support for the ambivalence hypothesis, as with all studies, the work of Trémeau and 
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colleagues suffered from several key limitations which, collectively, obscure making definitive 
judgments as to the status of ambivalence as a core symptom of schizophrenia. Most notably, 
apart from not statistically correcting for multiple pairwise comparisons, this study prompted 
participants to report on their emotional experience following each six second stimulus exposure 
and given that, stimulus modality (i.e., visual, auditory, orthographic), but not stimulus valence, 
was randomized within participants, it is possible that successive self-reported emotional 
experiences reflected the accrual of affective evaluations over the course of the experiment rather 
than independent emotional responses to single stimuli. This time-predicated effect may or may 
not have affected the results of this study however, in light of recent evidence, a more concerning 
limitation warrants mention. That is, a recent investigation by Kring, Gard, and Gard (2011) 
demonstrated that individuals with schizophrenia display specific difficulties in maintaining 
elicited emotional responses for longer than two and a half seconds following stimuli exposure 
offsets. Applied to the Trémeau et al. study, it is possible that the intervals during which 
participants were prompted to report their emotional experiences in reaction to elicitation stimuli 
were sufficiently long so as to require schizophrenia participants’ recruitment of cognitive 
structures not involved in the on-line processing of emotional experiences per se (e.g., negative 
cognitive schemata; Grant & Beck, 2009). In other words, the self-reports of the schizophrenia 
patients in this study may not have been ‘in-the-moment’, at least not in the usual sense of the 
phrase. It is thus clear that continuous, time-sensitive self-report measures of individuals’ 
emotional experience are important inclusions for further research of ambivalence in 
schizophrenia. 
Lastly, although all laboratory mood inductions are somewhat artificial in nature, there is 
evidence to suggest that some stimuli approximate more naturally occurring phenomena better 
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than others. In particular, although there is still much debate (e.g., Droit-Volet, Fayolle, & Gil, 
2011), emotion eliciting film clips have been put forth as more naturalistic, and therefore the 
results of which are more generalizable, than other types of stimuli such as static, inanimate 
items (e.g., Gross & Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). Despite the fact that 
Trémeau et al. (2009) used an assortment of evocative stimuli spanning a range of sensory 
modalities and found that results did not vary as a function of stimulus type, the trial-wise 
presentation of stimuli ensured that, unlike in real-world contexts, participants drew upon 
comparatively circumscribed aspects of their sensorium when reporting their emotional 
experience. Given that naturalistic emotional experience are invariably multivariate phenomena, 
and film clips may serve as adequate multimodal proxies for said phenomena, the use of 
emotion-eliciting film clips may introduce more ecological validity to the study of ambivalence 
in schizophrenia and therefore should be included in further research of this topic. 
1.7 Purpose 
 Although, there has been some preliminary evidence that ambivalence represents a 
pronounced feature of schizophrenia patients’ emotional experience, as described above, the only 
explicit experimental investigation of this phenomenon was limited by at least two salient 
shortcomings; namely, the use of static and not continuous measures of emotional experience 
and the somewhat artificial amalgamation of multisensory experimental stimulus sets as opposed 
to more naturalistic stimuli. Taken together with consideration for the inherent complexity of 
investigating schizophrenia patients’ emotional responses, the present study employed an 
emotionally evocative film clip as well as a novel methodology in order to explore the in-the-
moment emotional experiences of individuals with schizophrenia as well as those without a 
history of psychiatric illness. Accordingly, the present study had three aims: (1) to replicate 
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findings of self-reported trait anhedonia in patients with schizophrenia; (2) to compare overall 
elicited positivity, negativity, and ambivalence between individuals with schizophrenia and 
healthy control participants; and (3) to explore the nature of elicited ambivalent emotional 
experience in those with schizophrenia and healthy controls. 
1.8 Hypotheses 
 Emerging from the three-abovementioned aims, three sets of hypotheses were examined 
in this study. First, (1) a trait anhedonia hypothesis was examined wherein the schizophrenia 
group was predicted to self-report significantly higher levels of trait negative emotion and 
significantly lower levels of trait positive emotion than healthy controls using the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; see below). Second, (2) a three-
pronged emotional experience hypothesis was evaluated. In particular, (2a) as a formal 
manipulation check, the experimental film clip stimulus (see below) was predicted to elicit 
emotional responses within schizophrenia and healthy control groups individually.1 As well, (2b) 
serving as a formal evaluation of whether inattention or perseveration rather than emotional 
phenomenology led to group differences in self-reported emotional experience (e.g., 
schizophrenia patients became engrossed by the experimental or some other internal stimulus 
and consequently did not attend to the Evaluative Space Grid (see below) to update their 
emotional experience), it was predicted that the schizophrenia and healthy control groups would 
not significantly differ in the total number of self-reported emotional experiences, irrespective of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1That is, within both schizophrenia and healthy control groups independently, the amount of total time 
spent within the ‘HAPPY’, ‘SAD’, or ambivalent cells of the Evaluative Space Grid would be 




valence.2 As the third component of this emotional experience hypothesis, (2c) self-reported 
overall emotional experiences (i.e., across the duration of the experimental stimulus) were 
expected to vary as a function of group in the following pattern. 
i. Extrapolating from the findings of Cohen and Minor (2010) as well as those of Trémeau 
et al. (2009), the schizophrenia and healthy control groups were not expected to 
significantly differ in total amount of self-reported positive emotion across the 
experimental stimulus.3 
ii. Also in line with the findings of Cohen and Minor (2010) and Trémeau and colleagues 
(2009), the schizophrenia group was expected to indeed display a significantly greater 
total amount of self-reported negative emotion than was the healthy control group across 
the experimental stimulus.4 
iii. In accordance with the suggestions of both Cohen and Minor (2010) as well as the work 
of Trémeau et al. (2009), the schizophrenia group was expected to display a significantly 
greater total amount of self-reported ambivalent emotion than was the healthy control 
group across the experimental stimulus.5 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2The influence of participants’ inattention during the presentation of the experimental stimulus was 
difficult to control for and, moreover, it is unclear as to whether differences in attention are indeed 
irrelevant to the conscious experience of emotional states; in any case, this analysis assisted in the 
identification of putatively non-emotional factors that have the potential to create artifacts in participants’ 
self-reported emotional experiences. 
 
3That is, those in the schizophrenia and those in the healthy control group were not expected to differ in 
the total amount of time spent in the ‘HAPPY’ cell of the Evaluative Space Grid throughout the duration 
of the experimental stimulus. 
 
4That is, on average, those in the schizophrenia group were expected to spend a greater amount of time in 
the ‘SAD’ cell of the Evaluative Space Grid than were those in the healthy control group throughout the 
duration of the experimental stimulus. 
 
5That is, on average, those in the schizophrenia group were expected to spend a greater amount of time in 
the ambivalent cell of the Evaluative Space Grid than were those in the healthy control group throughout 
the duration of the experimental stimulus. 
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    Third, as a final set of hypotheses, (3) an exploration of the frequency and duration of 
ambivalent emotional experiences was conducted. (3a) It was anticipated that those in the 
schizophrenia group would exhibit a significantly greater number of ambivalent emotional 
experiences than would those in the healthy control group.6 Lastly, (3b) it was also expected that 
those in the schizophrenia group would display ambivalent emotional episodes with longer mean 
durations than that of those in the healthy control group. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6Number of emotional experiences were defined as entries into given cells of the Evaluative Space Grid; 
here, is it important to note that cell entries lesser than 500 ms in duration were excluded from all 
analyses in order to rule out erroneously counting fleeting “pass-through” cell entries as transitory 
emotional experiences when, for example, participants were merely passing through the ambivalent cell 
to report their univalent or null emotional experience. 
!
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CHAPTER 2. METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
 Schizophrenia sample. Twenty-seven individuals (23 males, 4 females; Mage = 40.78 
years, SDage = 12.82 years) were recruited from outpatient treatment programs operating out of 
several community mental health clinics located within the Lafayette and Baton Rouge 
metropolitan areas of southern Louisiana. The sample included 11 Caucasians, 15 African 
Americans, and one Native American. The average level of education completed for this sample 
was 10.93 years (SD = 1.84 years). At the time of testing, all participants were receiving either 
combination psychosocial and pharmacotherapy or psychotropic monotherapy under the 
supervision of a multidisciplinary treatment team. Inclusion criteria for this sample included (1) 
age between 18 and 65 years, (2) fluency in spoken and written English, and (3) a current or past 
DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder as determined 
by structured diagnostic interview using Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I 
Disorders (SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002). Interviews were individually 
conducted by a team of doctoral students in clinical psychology and all interviews were 
videotaped and reviewed as part of case conferences led by a licensed clinical psychologist with 
extensive experience diagnosing psychotic disorders (Dr. Alex S. Cohen). Final diagnostic 
decisions were based on unanimous agreement between case conference members.  
 Exclusion criteria for this sample included evidence of (1) neurological insult or head 
trauma requiring overnight hospitalization; (2) significant visual, auditory, or other sensory 
deficit that may have affected task performance; (3) DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) or otherwise 
significant substance dependence as indicated by physical symptoms (e.g., uncontrolled 
tremors); (4) inhalant use or ingestion of volatile vapors (e.g., aerosols) with significant lifetime 
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frequency (i.e., greater than six times); (5) DSM-IV-TR intellectual disability or other 
neurological condition which may have unduly compromised cognitive functioning; and (6) 
Global Assessment of Functioning (APA, 2000) ratings below 30 which denote a symptom 
disturbance which would have putatively interfered with task performance. 
 As compensation for their involvement, all participants received an honorarium of 
$40.00. In accord with the ethics approval granted by the Louisiana State University Institutional 
Review Board, informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to their participation 
(see Appendix A). As well, experimenters procured verbal assent from each participant prior to 
initiating the experimental tasks. 
 Healthy control sample. Twenty-nine individuals (13 males, 16 females; Mage = 39.62 
years, SDage = 12.45 years) were recruited from the Baton Rouge, Louisiana community. The 
sample included 16 Caucasians, 10 African Americans, one Hispanic American, and two 
individuals who self-identified their respective ethnic backgrounds as ‘other’. The average level 
of education completed for this sample was 14.41 years (SD = 2.37 years). Inclusion criteria for 
this sample were the same as with the schizophrenia sample with the exception that structured 
clinical interviews using SCID-I protocols (First et al., 2002) were administered in order to 
confirm the absence of current and past histories of schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders, 
mood disorders, and substance use disorders. Both the exclusion criteria and informed consent 
protocols used in the schizophrenia sample were used within the control sample and all control 
participants received the same remuneration as their diagnosed counterparts. 
2.2 Measures 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Trait positive and negative emotions 
were measured using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). 
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The PANAS is a 20-item self-report scale of emotional dispositions in which participants are 
presented with 10 negative (e.g., irritable, ashamed, hostile) and 10 positive (e.g., excited, 
enthusiastic, inspired) valence adjectives and are asked to use a five-point Likert scale, ranging 
from “very slightly or not at all” to “extremely”, to rate the extent to which they generally feel 
the specified emotion. The PANAS yields distinct Positive Affect and Negative Affect subscale 
scores and has been shown to have acceptable test-retest reliability over intervals of eight weeks 
and longer with temporal stability coefficients of .68 and .71 for the positive and negative affect 
subscales, respectively (Watson et al., 1988). In addition, Watson and colleagues have provided 
support for the internal consistencies of the PANAS with alpha coefficients of .88 and .87 for the 
respective positive and negative affect subscales. Within the present study sample (N = 56), 
alpha coefficient were .84 and .88 for the positive and negative affect subscales. Other research 
has further demonstrated robust content and construct validity of the PANAS insofar as the two-
factor structure has been replicated across a host of clinical and non-clinical samples (e.g., 
Crawford & Henry, 2004; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson et al., 1988) and the respective 
affect subscales correlate, in expected directions, with other personality scales and measures of 
psychopathology and distress (e.g., Watson, Clark, & Carey, 1988; Watson, et al., 1988). 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I).  The SCID-I 
(First et al., 2002) is a semi-structured, clinician-administered, broadband instrument that closely 
maps onto DSM-IV-TR criteria for psychiatric disorders and thus serves a means of formally 
operating DSM diagnostic algorithms. The SCID-I has been shown to have moderate to excellent 
test-retest (k = 0.44 - 0.78; Zanarini et al., 2000) and interrater (k = 0.56 - 0.96; Lobbestael, 
Leurgans, & Arntz, 2011) reliability estimates across several diagnostic categories including 
schizophrenia and the psychotic disorders. In addition, although debatable as to what constitutes 
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the standard against which assessment methods including the SCID-I should be compared so as 
to evaluate construct and criterion-related validities, several studies have demonstrated that the 
SCID-I outperforms other structured and unstructured interviews in terms of ascertaining DSM-
IV-TR diagnoses (e.g., Basco et al., 2000; Fennig, Craig, Lavelle, Kovasznay, & Bromet, 1994).  
2.3 Design 
 Using a quasi-experimental design, the present study included five training and one 
experimental trial for a total of six trials. Within each trial, participants were concurrently 
presented with a film stimulus and on-screen matrix with which to report their emotional 
experience in reaction to the particular stimulus. Trial presentation order was invariant across 
participants such that each participant was sequentially exposed to (1) the introduction trial 
followed by distinct (2) positive, (3) negative, (4) neutral, and (5) ambivalence training trials. 
Finally, participants were exposed to the (6) experimental trial (see below for a description of the 
film stimuli employed within each trial). 
2.4 Apparatus 
The emotional experience task utilized Dell XPS M1210 and Dell XPS M1330 laptop 
computers fitted with Affect Matrix Experiment Software (unpublished instrument, Texas Tech 
University) to present elicitation stimuli and record participants’ in-the-moment emotional 
experiences. The Affect Matrix Experiment Software provides a digitized reproduction of the 
Evaluative Space Grid (ESG; Larsen, Norris, McGraw, Hawkley, & Cacioppo, 2009) and allows 
for greater flexibility in tailoring the ESG to fit the particular experimental design parameters 
than does previously used paper-and-pencil formats (Larsen & McGraw, 2011). In particular, 
consistent with the evaluative space model (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo et al., 1997), 
the ESG enables participants to simultaneously rate the positive and negative components of 
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their emotional reactions to an experimental stimulus by using a computer mouse cursor to 












Figure 1. The Evaluative Space Grid (ESG). Positive emotion or ‘HAPPY’ is plotted along the 
x-axis and negative emotion or ‘SAD’ is plotted along the y-axis. After receiving instructions on 
how to use the ESG, the participant is presented with a stimulus and uses the computer mouse 
cursor to navigate to one of the grid’s four cells corresponding to the valence(s) of their 
experienced emotion. The bottom-left cell corresponds with null or negligible emotional 
experience; the bottom-right cell corresponds with univalent pleasant or otherwise positive 
emotional experience; the top-left cell corresponds with univalent unpleasant or otherwise 
negative emotional experience; and the top-right cell corresponds with mixed or ambivalent 
emotional experience. 
 
Along the x-axis of the grid rests positivity such that experienced positive emotion is 
reported by displacing the cursor to the right away from the origin (i.e., the point at which the x- 
and y-axes meet) and y-axis. Along the y-axis of the grid rests negativity such that experienced 
negative emotion is reported by displacing the cursor up, away from the origin and x-axis. By 
fixating the mouse cursor toward the origin (i.e., within the bottom-left quadrant of the grid), 





cursor away from both the x- and y-axes (i.e., within the top-right quadrant of the grid) 
participants are able to report mixed or ambivalent emotional experience. In line with previous 
work using this instrumentation (e.g., Larsen et al., 2009; Larsen & McGraw, 2011), Affect 
Matrix Experiment Software was programmed with a 20 Hz sampling rate such that reported 
emotional experiences (i.e., quadrant in which the cursor is located) were logged automatically 
every 500 ms. This protocol was beneficial in at least two main respects. First, given that cursor 
positions were sampled automatically at predetermined intervals, cognitive load incumbent on 
participants was reduced inasmuch as participants were not required to click on delimited grid 
cells nor were they required to ensure the accuracy of mouse clicks during stimulus 
presentations. Second, consonant with Davidson’s (1998) explication of affective chronometry, 
the 20 Hz/500 ms sampling rate enabled sufficient temporal resolution of the resultant data so to 
provide meaningful estimates of individuals’ real-time emotional experiences.  
As depicted in Figure 2, both ESG and elicitation stimuli were presented on-screen 
simultaneously, allowing participants to continually report (i.e., update) their emotional 
experiences as stimuli unfolded in time. Dell XPS M1210 and Dell XPS M1330 display monitors 
measure 13.3 in. and all participants sat approximately 23 in. away from the screen. 
Accompanying audio components of all elicitation stimuli were administered through SigmaTel 
High Definition Audio speakers. 
2.5 Elicitation Stimuli 
 Training stimuli. Five film clips were selected for this study for use in the five training 
trials. As a means of introducing the experimental display and ESG, the introduction stimulus 
was a 216 s film clip of an opaque black screen. The positive valence stimulus for use in the first 
training trial consisted of an excerpt from the contemporary television series The Office and  
! 39 
 
Figure 2. Screenshot of experimental display. The ESG is situated below the stimulus 
presentation window, wherein elicitation stimuli are presented, and remains on-screen 
throughout the duration of stimulus exposures.   
 
Lasted 145 s whereas the negative valence stimulus for use in the second training trial consisted 
of an excerpt from the film The Green Mile which lasted for 83 s. The neutral valence stimulus 
selected for use in the third training trial consisted of a 30 s wildlife scene from a commercially 
available nature documentary. Lastly, the ambivalent stimulus selected for use in the fourth 
training trial was a 184 s excerpt from the film Father of the Bride.    
 Experimental stimulus. As used in prior research with the ESG in which the stimulus 
was found to elicit ambivalent emotional responses in healthy undergraduate participants (Larsen 
& McGraw, 2011), the experimental film clip selected for this study was an excerpt from the 
traumatic comedy Life is Beautiful. The film is set in the late-1930s to mid-1940s Nazi Germany 
and follows the story of a Jewish-Italian family who, under the rule of the German Reich at the 
outbreak of World War II, are interned at a concentration camp. The father (Guido) and son 
(Joshua) are separated from the mother (Dora) and the film documents Guido’s perilless efforts 
 






to shelter his son from the abject nature of their situation by using humor and an elaborate 
stratagem to convince Joshua that their internment is a game in which the reunion with Dora is to 
be won. The clip selected as the experimental stimulus in the proposed study was the final 390 s 
of the film wherein Guido is executed so to ensure the survival of his son and, in turn, Joshua is 
reunited with his mother and reflects upon the devotion and sacrifices of his father. 
2.6 Procedure 
 As part of a larger investigation into schizophrenia psychopathology, experimental 
sessions were held within quiet, idle settings of participants’ residences and across two 2-hour 
testing periods; the first of which was used to obtain informed consent and have participants 
perform a number of tasks such as the recording of natural speech, the completion of several 
questionnaires including the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) and a demographics questionnaire, as 
well as participating in the structured clinical interview. Structured interviews were recorded by 
JVC Everio HDD 35x Optical Zoom video cameras situated between interviewer-interviewee 
dyads so to capture participants’ verbal and behavioral responses to interviewer queries. During 
the second testing period, and in addition to the emotional experience task, participants’ 
performed a series of tasks including completing a battery of measures probing neurocognitive 
and social functioning as well as completing a further set of self-report questionnaires. 
To begin the emotional experience task specifically, participants were seated in front of 
the experimental computer whereon Affect Matrix Experiment Software (unpublished 
instrument, Texas Tech University) was used to initiate the first of the five training trials. 
Concurrently, experimenters used a set of standardized instructions (see Appendix B), adapted 
from those of Larsen and colleagues (2009) as well as Russell, Weiss, and Mendelson (1989), to 
familiarize participants with the experimental apparatus and explain task parameters. It is 
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important to note that, during the series of training trials wherein introduction and training 
stimuli were presented, examiners guided or otherwise aided participants in reporting their 
emotional experiences in reaction to stimuli using the on-screen ESG.7 Here, it is also important 
to note that this assistance was included as part of the standardized instructions and that all 
experimenters participated in didactic training prior to data collection so to ensure an acceptable 
level of proficiency in administering task directives.  
Pursuant to the completion of the training trials, experimenters provided the following 
short narrative in order to provide context for the experimental stimulus prior to directing Affect 
Matrix Experiment Software to implement the experimental trial: 
This movie is set in Nazi Germany during World War II. Of the many horrible things that 
took place during this time, one of the worst was that many families were broken apart. 
People were taken from their loved ones and imprisoned in concentration camps where 
they faced slavery and the constant threat of death. Despite this horrific reality facing 
many of those who experienced these camps, some people persevered and lived 
remarkable lives. (see Appendix B) 
 
Experimental trials lasted for the duration of the experimental stimulus (i.e., 390 s). At any point 
during the experimental trials, when experimenters perceived that participants were not 
attending, unduly perseverating, or were otherwise exerting perfunctory effort towards the on-
screen presentation, experimenters encouraged participants with nonpunitive prompts in order to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7Although experimenter assistance during training trials was necessary to ensure that participants 
generally, and those patients with cognitive deficits specifically, comprehended the experimental 
apparatus and task, it is notable that these interventions precluded meaningful analysis of emotional 
experiences to training stimuli and the evaluation of any affective priming effects. That is, although not 
quantified in the present study, it is likely that the social interactions of explicit corrective assistance 
provided by experimenters effectively introduced noise or error variance into participants’ reported 
emotional experiences to training stimuli. Moreover, apart from these artifacts, 13 participants in the 
schizophrenia group were administered at least one training stimulus more than once due to inattention, 
distraction, or other difficulties with task comprehension. The invariant valence sequence of training trial 
administration across participants was a purposeful methodological control for differential affective 
priming effects between experimental groups however it is a regrettable acknowledgment that the present 
experimental design was not conducive for examining the affective priming issue statistically. 
!
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maximize the internal validity of the resultant data (i.e., “Remember, focus on the movie clip and 
how it makes you feel and select the square that most accurately characterizes your feelings,” 
“Remember, how you feel may change throughout the clip so it’s important that you update how 
you feel by selecting the appropriate square.”). Overall, including all training and experimental 
trials, the emotional experience task took approximately 20 minutes to administer. Afterwards, 
participants were thanked for their participation, rewarded with the aforementioned recompense, 
and debriefed regarding the study hypotheses, rationale, applications, and anticipated results. 
2.7 Analyses 
 Data analysis for the present study was conducted in eight steps and all analyses were 
completed using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 20 (2011). First, descriptive statistics for all 
variables were computed and a review of derivative histograms, skew and kurtosis statistics, as 
well as a series of Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Shapiro-Wilk, and Levene’s tests were used to evaluate 
the assumptions of parametric data. Second, a series chi-square, Fisher’s exact, Mann-Whitney 
U, and Kruskal-Wallis tests as well as a collection of bivariate correlations, were used in order to 
evaluate the presence of potentially confounding variables. Third, in order to evaluate the trait 
anhedonia hypothesis, a pair of Mann-Whitney U tests were used to compare the schizophrenia 
and healthy control groups on trait positive and negative affect subscale scores of the PANAS, 
respectively. Fourth, as a means of determining whether the experimental film clip stimulus 
indeed evoked emotional responses in both the schizophrenia and healthy control groups, a pair 
of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used whereby the summed amount of total time spent within 
the ‘HAPPY’, ‘SAD’, and ambivalent cells of the ESG were compared with the amount of total 
time spent within the lone ‘NONE’ cell of the ESG. Fifth, as a means of examining whether 
inattention or perseveration confounded the self-reported emotional experiences of participants, a 
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Mann-Whitney U test was used to compare the mean number of total emotional experiences, 
independent of valence, for the schizophrenia and healthy control groups. Sixth, in order to 
evaluate the emotional experience hypothesis proper, overall self-reported emotional experiences 
(i.e., total time spent within the respective ESG cells across the duration of the experimental 
stimulus) was submitted to an omnibus 2 (Group: schizophrenia, healthy control) x 3 (Emotion: 
‘HAPPY’, ‘SAD’, ambivalent) mixed design ANOVA; wherein Group was the between-subjects 
factor and Emotion was the within-subjects factor.8 In turn, a series of a priori pairwise 
comparisons (i.e., Mann-Whitney U tests) were conducted wherein the schizophrenia and healthy 
control groups were compared on the total amount of time spent experiencing positive, negative, 
and ambivalent emotions. Insofar as these comparisons were planned contrasts and thus may 
have been used in place of the omnibus mixed design ANOVA, no correction for the inflation of 
the familywise Type I error rate was applied.9 Lastly, seventh, in order to evaluate the frequency 
and average duration of ambivalent emotional experiences in the schizophrenia and healthy 
control groups, two pairwise contrasts were conducted. Specifically, (1) a Mann-Whitney U test 
was used to compare the frequency or number of ambivalent emotional experiences (see 
Footnote 6) between the schizophrenia and healthy control groups. Subsequently, (2) a further 
Mann-Whitney U test was used to compare the mean durations of self-reported ambivalent 
emotional experiences for the schizophrenia and healthy control groups. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8In an effort to control for linear dependency inherent to the data derived from the 2x2 Evaluative Space 
Grid, apart from the abovementioned manipulation check, null emotional experience was excluded from 
all analyses. 
 
9Although not cited as part of the formal hypotheses of the present study, a further set of exploratory 
pairwise contrasts examining group differences in frequency and mean duration of univalent positive and 
univalent negative emotional experiences were conducted and are reported in the Positive and Negative 
Valence Emotional Experience section below. 
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2.8 Power Analysis 
 Power analyses and computation of nonparametric effect sizes were completed using 
G*Power 3.1.2 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2009). All analyses were non-
directional, two-tailed tests with significance levels set at .05 (i.e., ! = .05) and, in accordance 
with Cohen (1992), respective statistical powers (1-") approximating .80. Mapping these 
parameters onto the Mann-Whitney U tests intended to evaluate the trait anhedonia hypothesis, 
the power analysis revealed that a sample size of 54 individuals (ns = 27) was required in order 
to detect group differences at a large effect size or greater (d = 0.80; Cohen, 1992). This sample 
size represents an upper-bound of N for all tests intended to evaluate both the trait anhedonia and 
the emotional experience hypotheses given that the a priori pairwise contrasts adhered to the 
same directionality, alpha-level, and targeted effect size parameters of the trait anhedonia 
hypothesis tests. Moreover, by virtue of the statistical power gained in using repeated measures 
approaches, the two Wilcoxon signed-rank tests intended as manipulation checks (i.e., to 
examine the effectiveness of the experimental stimulus in inducing emotional responses in 
schizophrenia and healthy control groups) required fewer participants to obtain commensurate 
power to detect statistical differences of the same d = 0.80 effect size. Indeed, an additional 
power analysis revealed that a sample size of 30 individuals would have been sufficient to detect 
within-subject differences in emotional experience at a large effect size or greater, according to 
Cohen’s suggested conventions. Overall, then, the sample (N = 56) obtained in this study enabled 
adequate power to detect group differences of at least a large effect size magnitude. 
 Given the novelty of the proposed research employing the ESG within a sample of 
individuals with schizophrenia, conducting an a priori power analysis for the proposed omnibus 
mixed design ANOVA as part of the evaluation of the emotional experience hypothesis posed a 
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significant difficulty. In particular, it was unclear as to the best strategy one should use in 
ascertaining a judicious estimate of the correlation between participants overall self-reported 
emotional experience (i.e., proportion of time spent within the respective ESG cells). 
Accordingly, a conservative strategy was adopted in order to conduct a final power analysis 
wherein the requisite sample size for the ANOVA was computed for an entirely between-
subjects factorial model. Similar to the results of the abovementioned power analysis for the 
pairwise tests, the results of this approach indicated that, with significance levels set at .05, 
statistical power approaching .80, and the specification of two experimental groups, a minimum 
sample size of 52 individuals (ns = 26) was required in order to document main and interaction 
effects at a large effect size or greater (ƒ = .40; Cohen, 1992). Thus, insofar an obtained sample 
of 56 participants – 27 of which met DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criteria for schizophrenia with 
the remaining 29 not meeting criteria for a DSM-IV-TR psychotic, mood, or substance use 
disorder – was employed in this study, the herein discussed analyses may be considered 
adequately powered to document large effect size group differences. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESULTS 
3.1 Exploring the Demographic, PANAS, and Emotional Experience Variables 
 A visual inspection of the individual histogram graphs generated for each of the 
demographic, PANAS, and emotional experience variables indicated that all variables in the 
present study failed to meet the normality assumption for parametric statistics. This indication 
was further confirmed by a review of respective z-score converted skew and kurtosis statistics as 
well as a series of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests. In particular, with the exception 
of education level with zskewness = 1.27 and zkurtosis = 0.65, all computed skewness and kurtosis z-
scores were beyond the 1.96 absolute value cutoff for p < .05. As well, according to the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality, all demographics, including 
education level, departed from a normal distribution within the full study sample (N = 56; ps # 
.03), as did each of the PANAS and emotional experience variables within the respective 
schizophrenia (n = 27) and healthy control (n = 29) samples (ps # .02).  
A visual inspection of the histograms further revealed either (a) no outliers within 
variable distributions or (b) no outlying participant that was atypical across more than one of the 
PANAS or emotional experience variables and could therefore be defensibly excluded in order to 
adjust for skewness. Although debatable (e.g., Glass, Peckham, & Sanders, 1972, as cited in 
Field, 2009), several data trimming and transformation procedures were considered. However, 
regarding the former, it was determined that, although the use of a trimmed mean may address 
persistent issues of non-normality, as per select Levene’s tests, this manipulation would not 
broadly address heterogeneity of variance issues. Regarding the former, it was determined that 
data transformations would unduly complicate the interpretations of any derived results and, in 
any case, a trial-and-error exploration of square, square root, and reciprocal transformations 
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indicated that none of these methods adequately corrected for skewness. Accordingly, then, 
given the distributions of the variables included in this study, non-parametric tests were utilized 
throughout.10 
3.2 Confound Analyses 
 Given the quasi-experimental design of the present study, select demographic variables 
were examined between groups as a preliminary means of identifying experimental confounds. 
The results of these analyses revealed three potential confounds in that the schizophrenia and 
healthy control groups differed on sex ($2[1] = 9.92, p < .01, Cramer’s V = 0.42), ethnicity 
(Fisher’s exact test, p < .01, Cramer’s V = 0.32), and education level (U = 87.00, p < .01, d = 
1.4311), but not on age (U = 369.50, p = .72, d = 0.08) characteristics. In order to evaluate 
whether pre-existing group differences in sex, ethnicity, and education level affected or were 
otherwise related to the dependent variables of the present study, a series of point-biserial 
correlations, Kruskal-Wallis tests, and Spearman’s rho correlations were conducted. These tests 
indicated that there were no associations between sex and any dependent measure that crossed 
the conventional ! = .05 level of statistical significance (rpb range = -.09 to .25, ps % .06). At 
trend levels, sex was correlated with both the total amount of self-reported positive emotion (rpb 
= .24, p = .08) and mean duration of self-reported positive emotional experiences (rpb = .25, p = 
.06). However, in light of both the number of point-biserial correlations computed which, 
without adjusting the ! = .05 level, inflated the likelihood of committing a Type I error as well as 
the relatively small effect sizes of the two associations, it was determined that there was little to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10In an effort to safeguard against Type II errors, all analyses were concurrently conducted using 
equivalent or proxy parametric tests. However, unless otherwise noted, final results do not differ between 
non-parametric and parametric methods.  
!
11Although there is no consensus effect size estimate for use with nonparametric statistics, Grissom and 
Kim (2012) recommended a d like estimator calculated by taking the difference between the group 
median scores and dividing by the pooled standard deviation.  
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warrant including sex as a confound in the ensuing analyses involving total amount and mean 
duration of positive emotional experiences. The series of Kruskal-Wallis tests indicated that 
there were no statistically reliable ethnicity differences across the range of PANAS and 
emotional experience variables (H[4] range = 0.22 to 5.70, ps % .22, mean &2 = .07). Further, the 
bivariate Spearman’s correlations indicated that educational level was not significantly related to 
any PANAS or emotional experience dependent measure (' range = -.22 to .22, ps % .10). Taken 
together, on the basis of these investigations, the below analyses were conducted without 
attempting to partial out the influence of any demographic variable.  
3.3 Trait Anhedonia Hypothesis 
 Contrary to the trait anhedonia hypothesis, using the PANAS, individuals in the 
schizophrenia (Mdn = 37.00) and healthy control (Mdn = 36.00) groups tended to report similar 
levels of trait positive emotion (U = 360.00, z = -0.52, p = .61, d = 0.1512). However, consistent 
with the abovementioned trait anhedonia hypothesis, those in the schizophrenia group (Mdn = 
19.00) indeed reported greater trait negative emotion than did those in the healthy control group 
(Mdn = 15.00), U = 208.00, z = -3.02, p < .01, d = 0.62.  
3.4 Emotional Experience Manipulation Check 
 Evidencing the effectiveness of the experimental mood induction procedure, a Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test indicated that, within the schizophrenia group, participants spent a greater 
amount of time within one of the valenced cells of the ESG (i.e., ‘HAPPY’, ‘SAD’, or 
ambivalent; Mdn = 332.50 s) relative to time spent within the null emotion (i.e., ‘NONE’; Mdn = 
58.50 s) cell of the ESG across the duration of the experimental stimulus (T = 43.00, p < .01, d = 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12The calculation of a posteriori or observed power was considered for this and all reported null findings 
however, as per Hoenig and Heisey (2001), and insofar as these estimates have been found to be routinely 
low (Zumbo & Hubley, 1998) and therefore likely to mislead, the decision was made to omit these 
statistics.!
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2.81). A further Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicated that, within the healthy control group, the 
experimental mood induction was effective in that participants also spent a greater amount of 
time within one of the valenced cells of the ESG (Mdn = 303.50 s) relative to the amount of time 
spent within the null emotion cell (Mdn = 87.50 s; T = 28.00, p < .01, d = 2.76). 
3.5 Between-Group Differences in Inattention or Perseveration 
 A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that, regardless of valence, participants in the 
schizophrenia (Mdn = 7.00) and healthy control (Mdn = 11.00) groups did not report 
significantly different numbers of discrete emotional episodes (U = 334.50, p = .35, d = 0.55). 
This indicated that inattention and/or perseverative responding to the experimental stimulus was 
similar, or at least not appreciably dissimilar, between the groups.  
3.6 Overall Emotional Experience 
 Figures 3 through 6 present time course graphs depicting the proportion of individuals in 
the respective schizophrenia and healthy control groups who reported the specified subjective 
emotional experiences plotted across the 390 s duration of the experimental stimulus13. A mixed 
designed factorial ANOVA, with Group entered as the between-subjects factor and Emotion (i.e., 
total amount of rank-transformed14 positive, negative, and ambivalent emotional experience) 
entered as the within-subjects factor, failed to find a statistically significant two-way Group by 
Emotion interaction, F(2,108) = 2.17, p = .12, !2 = 0.04, nor significant main effects for Group, 
F(1, 54) = 1.43, p = .24, !2 = 0.03, or Emotion, F(2, 108) = 1.79, p = .18, !2 = 0.03.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13Data displayed in Figures 3 through 6 are used for descriptive purposes only and are not included in any 
of the included inferential statistical analyses. 
 
14Following Conover (1999), the recommended procedure in experimental designs for which no 
nonparametric test exists is to use the parametric method on both rank-transformed and non-transformed 
data. The results of the mixed design ANOVA using non-transformed variables fully replicated the null 
findings of the herein discussed analyses. 
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Figure 3. Time course graph depicting the proportion of participants in the schizophrenia (red) 
and healthy control (blue) groups reporting null subjective emotional experience across the 
duration of the experimental stimulus. 
 
Figure 4. Time course graph depicting the proportion of participants in the schizophrenia (red) 
and healthy control (blue) groups reporting univalent positive subjective emotional experience 








































































Figure 5. Time course graph depicting the proportion of participants in the schizophrenia (red) 
and healthy control (blue) groups reporting univalent negative subjective emotional experience 
across the duration of the experimental stimulus. 
 
Figure 6. Time course graph depicting the proportion of participants in the schizophrenia (red) 
and healthy control (blue) groups reporting ambivalent subjective emotional experience across 











































































3.7 Positive and Negative Valence Emotional Experience 
Along with other descriptive statistics, Table 1 displays the group-wise mean total 
amounts of univalent positive and negative (and null) subjective emotional experience reported 
across the experimental stimulus. A series of planned contrasts confirmed the above null findings 
in that those in the schizophrenia and healthy control groups tended to report similar total 
amounts of positive (U = 384.50, z = -0.12, p = .91, d = 0.18) and negative (U = 390.50, z = -
0.02, p = .99, d = 0.04) emotional experience throughout the experimental stimulus. Although 
not part of the cited hypotheses of this study, a set of exploratory analyses indicated that there 
were no statistically reliable group differences in frequency or average duration of univalent 
emotional episodes (see Table 1). That is, whether in the schizophrenia or healthy control group, 
all participants tended to report comparable incidence of positive (U = 348.00, z = -0.73, p = .47, 
d = 0) and negative (U = 383.50, z = -0.13, p = .89, d = 0) emotional experiences. As well, 
individuals in each group tended to report positive (U = 337.00, z = -0.89, p = .37, d = 0.33) and 
negative (U = 377.00, z = -0.24, p = .81, d = 0.13) emotional episodes of similar mean durations. 
3.8 Ambivalent Emotional Experience 
 Table 2 contains descriptive statistics regarding the range of indices of ambivalent 
emotional experience examined in this study. In addition, group-wise total amounts of 
ambivalent emotional experiences reported throughout the duration of the experimental stimulus 
are displayed in Figure 7. Consonant with the abovementioned mixed design ANOVA, a Mann-
Whitney U test indicated that those in the schizophrenia (Mdn = 15.00 s) and healthy control 
(Mdn = 35.50 s) groups tended to report comparable amounts of subjective ambivalence, U = 
339.00, z = -0.87, p = .39, d = 0.38. As graphically displayed in Figure 8, a further test indicated 







Figure 7. Average total amount of subjective ambivalent emotional experience reported for each 
group across the 390 s duration of the experimental stimulus. Error bars denote +/- one standard 
error of the mean. 
 
 
Figure 8. Average total number of discrete ambivalent emotional episodes reported for each 
group throughout the entire 390 s duration of the experimental stimulus. Error bars denote +/- 
one standard error of the mean. 
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reliability different frequency counts of discrete ambivalent emotional episodes, U = 289.00, z = 
-1.72, p = .09, d = 0.31. Lastly, a final a priori Mann-Whitney U test indicated that individuals in 
the schizophrenia (Mdn = 7.50 s) and healthy control (Mdn = 13.50 s) groups reported 
ambivalent emotional episodes with comparable average lengths or durations, U = 358.50, z = -
0.54, p = .59, d = 0.21 (see Figure 9)15.  
 
Figure 9. Average duration of discrete ambivalent emotional episodes reported for each group. 






15Given the susceptibility of the arithmetic mean statistic to the influence of outliers (i.e., inordinately 
brief or prolonged ESG cell entries), which could feasibly reflect participant error (e.g., inattentive [ff.] 
perseveration in a given ESG cell) or artifact of the time-limited nature of the experimental stimulus (e.g., 
late onset episodes of ambivalence truncated due to the automatic termination of the ESG upon 
experimental stimulus conclusion), median episode durations were also computed as indices of central 
tendency. These indices were analyzed for group differences however, without exception, the 
schizophrenia and healthy control groups did not demonstrate differential median durations of positive, 
negative, or ambivalent emotional episodes (ps > .10). 
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CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION 
 Although there remains much debate as to the viability of experiencing veridical 
ambivalence (e.g., Larsen & McGraw, 2011; Russell, 2003), previous research points to this 
phenomenon as the potential mental state that predominates schizophrenia patients’ 
phenomenological experiences of the world (Cohen & Minor, 2010; Trémeau et al., 2009). 
However, evidence for this assertion has to this point been indirect, inconsistent, or entirely 
novel and therefore pending replication. Furthermore, prior research has been limited by several 
methodological constraints, which thus limits drawing any definitive conclusions as to the status 
of ambivalence as a pronounced feature of schizophrenia patients’ emotional experience. 
Accordingly, this study attempted to provide a more sensitive test of whether patients with 
schizophrenia, relative to healthy controls, experience inordinate ambivalence by having 
participants use the ESG to report their in-the-moment emotions in reaction to a controlled 
laboratory film clip stimulus. 
4.1 Summary of Findings 
 As a means of replicating prior work documenting trait-like anhedonia within 
schizophrenia (e.g., Blanchard et al., 1998), this investigation used the 20-item PANAS (Watson 
et al., 1988) to examine participants’ trait positive and negative emotion. Contrary to the 
hypothesized diminution of positive emotion within patients with schizophrenia, however, 
participants from both experimental groups tended to report similar amounts of dispositional or 
trait-like positivity. Conversely, reports of trait-like negative emotion were in line with prior 
research in that those with schizophrenia endorsed greater trait negative emotion than did healthy 
control participants. A more extensive discussion of these findings is detailed below however it 
is worth noting here that the null difference between schizophrenia and healthy control 
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participants’ self-reported trait positive emotion, though inconsistent with a majority of studies, 
is consistent with Gurrera, Nestor, and O’Donnell (2000) as well as Akdag and colleagues 
(2003); both of which investigations included samples comparable to that of the present study 
with regards to schizophrenic illness chronicity and sex distributions within groups. 
 Regarding in-the-moment emotional experience, as measured by the ESG, a formal 
manipulation check indicated that the use of the Life is Beautiful stimulus effectively produced 
emotional responses within both experimental groups. Moreover, as no between-group 
differences were observed in aggregate numbers of discrete emotional episodes, it is unlikely that 
inattention or other putative emotional experience confounds differentially affected the 
generalized experiences of either group. These validity analyses enable more straightforward 
interpretations of the resultant self-reports of participants’ in-the-moment emotional experiences.
 Visual inspections of Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 indicate that there are several intervals during 
which, as groups, individuals with schizophrenia and healthy controls reported nominally 
different emotional experiences. For example, a numerically greater proportion of individuals 
with schizophrenia reported experiencing positive emotion relative to the proportion of healthy 
controls reporting this emotion during an interval of the clip beginning at approximately 170 s 
and extending to approximately 240 s. In addition, beginning at approximately 25 s and 
continuing through until nearly 130 s of the film clip stimulus, a numerically greater proportion 
of individuals with schizophrenia reported experiencing ambivalence relative to the proportion of 
individuals reporting this emotion in the healthy control group. Although interesting, there is no 
precedent for parsing segmented emotional experience time course data post hoc and thus little 
guidance on how to properly balance the likelihoods of committing Type I and II errors when 
examining group differences at various intervals within the experimental film clip stimulus. In 
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addition, it is difficult to construe these numerical group differences as more than stimulus-
specific effects which may not generalize to other laboratory stimuli or, more importantly, real-
world stimuli and events (e.g., social partners and activities). Accordingly, the results presented 
in Figures 3 through 6 are interesting descriptive heuristics however the omnibus and planned 
pair-wise contrasts provide more substantive indications of participants’ in-the-moment 
emotional experience.  
The results of these analyses are as follows. First, as hypothesized, those with 
schizophrenia and healthy controls did not report experiencing notably different total amounts of 
positive emotion throughout the experimental stimulus nor did the groups report reliably 
different frequencies and average durations of discrete positive emotional episodes. Second, 
contrary to what was hypothesized, when generalized across the experimental stimulus, those 
with schizophrenia and healthy controls did not significantly differ along any measured 
dimension of univalent negative emotional experience (i.e., total amount of negativity, frequency 
and average duration of negative emotional episodes). Finally, also contrary to what was 
hypothesized based on the work of Cohen and Minor (2010) as well as Trémeau and colleagues 
(2009), the schizophrenia and healthy control participants did not demonstrate reliable 
differences in total amount of ambivalence reported during the Life is Beautiful film clip nor did 
the two experimental groups substantially differ in the number of ambivalent episodes reported 
or the average duration of those episodes.  
4.2 Trait Anhedonia 
 The elevated trait negative emotion found in this study is a direct replication of prior 
work and thus reinforces the notion that basal elevations of negative emotional states 
characterize the reported everyday experiences of schizophrenia patients (Horan et al., 2005).  
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The finding that patients with schizophrenia did not exhibit attenuated trait positive emotion 
relative to individuals without mental illness diagnoses, on the other hand, flies in the face a 
large body of studies documenting trait anhedonia in schizophrenia (e.g., Berenbaum & Fujita, 
1994; Blanchard et al., 1998; Horan et al., 2005). Collectively, these previous investigations 
employ a range of instruments including retrospective self-report questionnaires and interview-
based measures (Horan et al., 2006), thereby detracting from the plausibility of a method artifact 
interpretation of this finding (e.g., that the Positive Affect subscale of the PANAS was 
insufficiently sensitive to document diminished positivity within schizophrenia). It does warrant 
mention, however, that, although state variants of the scale have been used previously with 
schizophrenia samples (e.g., Kring et al., 1993; Kring & Neale, 1996), this study’s use of the 
PANAS as a measure of trait emotional experience is a novelty to the emotion within 
schizophrenia literature. It is therefore possible that another psychometric scale such as the 
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire or other measure used more extensively with 
psychotic disorder populations may have indeed evidenced diminished trait positive emotion 
within the schizophrenia sample relative to the healthy control sample. Nevertheless, this is 
improbable given that (1) the extensive application and associated validation of the PANAS 
across numerous pathological and non-pathological samples (e.g., Crawford & Henry, 2004; 
Watson & Tellegen, 1985); and (2) the ability of the Negative Affect subscale to document 
elevated schizophrenic trait negative emotion in this study; taken with (3) the appreciable 
reliability of the measure observed in this study, gives little indication that the use of the PANAS 
was an inappropriate measure for this sample. Instead, as alluded to above, a potentially more 
plausible explanation for the null finding of trait anhedonia derives from a comparison of the 
present study to that of Gurrera et al. (2000) and Akdag et al. (2003) in which those with 
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schizophrenia in contrast to healthy controls also exhibited elevated trait negative emotion but 
not significantly different trait positive emotion. Explicitly, given the irregularity of the null 
findings reported in these three studies, an examination of their similarities may elucidate as to 
how best to reconcile this research with the larger trait anhedonia in schizophrenia literature. 
 There are two salient commonalities to these investigations: the use of chronic 
schizophrenia outpatient samples (e.g., mean ages of 40.78 and 41.60 years within this study and 
Akdag and colleagues’, respectively) and the preponderance of males studied (e.g., 85% and 
100% male within this study and Gurrera et al., respectively). These sampling characteristics are 
not uncommon to schizophrenia research however they indeed represent potential moderators to 
the trait anhedonia effect frequently ascribed to the disorder. As indicated by McGorry (2007), 
research in clinical staging suggests that different intervals of illness may correspond with 
different symptomatology and thus stages of illness should be routinely factored into studies 
examining features of schizophrenic psychopathology. Given that the sample employed within 
the present study, as with that of Gurrera et al. and Akdag et al., was comprised primarily of 
chronic, stable schizophrenia outpatients, it is possible that non-diminished trait positive emotion 
may represent the partial remission of more acute affective disturbance seen in earlier, more 
florid stages of illness (e.g., first-episode schizophrenia; cf. Marengo, Harrow, Herbener, & 
Sands, 2000). Regarding the potential influence of sex, as illustrated by Kring and Moran (2008), 
the vast majority of emotion in schizophrenia studies report results collapsed across sexes despite 
evidence for sex-differences in disease characteristics and trajectories (Goldstein & Link, 1988). 
Insofar as the sample of the present study was comprised mostly of men, it is possible that the 
inclusion of more female schizophrenia participants would be more likely to replicate the trait 
anhedonia effect. In support of this possibility, there is some evidence that female schizophrenia 
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patients exhibit more affective features including a host of depressive symptoms and dysphonia 
(Salem & Kring, 1998).  
Overall, despite the potential moderating effects of chronicity and sex, a more recent 
review by Horan, Blanchard, Clark, and Green (2008) indicates that patterns of diminished trait 
positive and elevated trait negative emotion in schizophrenia are robust to differences in 
inpatient versus outpatient treatment, recent-onset versus chronic stages of illness, and other 
sampling characteristics. Thus, as it is not immediately clear what accounts for the discrepancy 
between the present study and others in self-reported trait anhedonia among those with schizo-
phrenia, the topic requires further inquiry in order to square this finding with the larger literature.  
4.3 Univalent Positive and Negative Emotional Experience  
 The general lack of group differences in univalent emotional experience reported in this 
study is consistent with over half of the emotional experience studies reviewed by Kring and 
Moran (2008). In particular, the non-abnormal positive emotional experience within individuals 
with schizophrenia is a replication of several works (e.g., Burbridge & Barch, 2007; Horan et al., 
2006). However, given the importance of delineating positively- and negatively-valenced 
emotional components (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo et al., 1997), as well as the clear 
import of monitoring the valence of stimuli used to elicit emotional responses, the findings of 
this study are novel in that group differences in univalent emotional experience were not 
observed when such experiences were evoked by a laboratory stimulus with an admixture of 
positive and negative properties. More explicitly, prior studies eschewing bipolar emotion ratings 
in favor of unipolar ratings have tended to employ distinct positive, negative, and neutral stimuli 
to elicit emotional responses. It is the use of these controlled univalent stimuli that has provided 
indications of abnormal emotional responding within schizophrenia (e.g., inordinate negative 
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emotion in response to positive stimuli, elevated negative emotion in response to neutral stimuli; 
Cohen & Minor, 2010). This study extended this line of inquiry by employing a stimulus with 
more mixed, less discrete valences and the results indicate that those with and without 
schizophrenia process these more complex stimuli similarly and do not consequently experience 
notably different positive or negative emotions. Otherwise put, on the bases of these findings, 
there is clear indication that, over the course of an evolving narrative including dynamic positive 
and negative valence features, individuals with schizophrenia experience univalent emotions in 
the same way as do those without diagnoses of severe mental illness. 
Apart from tonic or trait-like negativity (Horan et al., 2005), which was, incidentally, 
replicated in this study, there was sound a priori reason to expect elevated negative emotion in 
response to a mixed emotion film clip. For example, individuals with schizophrenia have been 
shown in three prior studies employing unipolar scales to endorse greater negative emotional 
experience across positive, negative, and neutral film clips (Earnst & Kring, 1999; Kring et al., 
1993; Kring & Neale, 1996). As well, insofar as the presentation of a stimulus with mixed 
affective properties within a controlled setting likely demands greater effort and concentration in 
order for individuals with likely cognitive deficits to comprehend, increased negative emotion 
was expected on the basis of these efforts alone. Further, negative emotional experience 
represents an epiphenomenon of ambivalence in that increased ambivalence has been shown to 
produce emotional distress and upset (van Harreveld, van der Pligt, & de Liver, 2009). 
Therefore, to the extent that a stimulus with mixed affective qualities was predicted to produce 
greater ambivalence within those putatively liable to these emotional states (i.e., those with 
schizophrenia; although see below for discussion), it stood to reason that a preponderance of 
negative emotion would occur within the more ambivalent schizophrenia participants.  
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Why, then, given these rationales, did individuals with schizophrenia and those without 
mental illness not statistically differ on any metric of negative emotional experience? One 
possibility noted by Kring and Moran (2008) pertains to the extensive variability in findings 
noted throughout schizophrenia emotion elicitation studies employing film clip stimuli. That is, it 
is feasible that many of the findings reported in this literature comprise stimulus-specific effects 
which are therefore not directly generalizable to other stimuli or situations. Giving credence to 
this assertion, it is noteworthy that each of the three studies by Kring and colleagues using 
unipolar scales to document greater negative emotional experience within schizophrenia all 
employed the same film stimuli. Another possibility is that the mixed valence stimulus selected 
for this study contained enough unambiguously negative segments that it lacked the power to 
discriminate between groups when indices of emotional experiences were tabulated across the 
duration of the stimulus. Explicitly, if a significant portion of the experimental stimulus 
produced negative emotional experience within all participants, then only negative experiences 
different from the healthy control baseline in the large effect size range are likely to register as 
statistically significant differences. In view of Cohen and Minor’s (2010) finding that 
schizophrenia patients’ inordinate negative responses resulting from negative stimuli is of a 
small magnitude (i.e., effect size = 0.24), it is perhaps unsurprising that the two groups in this 
study did not differ in any measure of negative emotional experience across the entirety of the 
Life is Beautiful film clip. To further this point, it is worth noting that, Larsen and McGraw 
(2011) contend that all ambivalent film clip stimuli invariably include univalent components as 
these features are what set the context for genuine ambivalent experience. In this study, as 
displayed in Figure 5, for approximately 160 s of the 390 s duration of the experimental stimulus, 
around or above half of the proportion of individuals in both groups reported experiencing 
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negative emotional experience. Although the omnibus ANOVA did not indicate a main effect for 
emotion, it remains the case that a significant minority of the total experimental stimulus was 
experienced by both groups as uniformly negative which thereby makes discerning any small 
difference in overall negative emotional experience difficult.  
Overall, either of the above possibilities point to clear directions for future research such 
as the inclusion of multiple evocative stimuli and a more fine-grained parsing of the emotional 
experience data or the use of more time-predicated analyses. Still, these analyses 
notwithstanding, on the basis of the present results, the positive and negative in-the-moment 
emotional experiences of individuals with and without schizophrenia are largely 
indistinguishable from one another such that the univalent experiences of individuals with 
schizophrenia cannot be readily considered out and out pathological. 
4.4 Ambivalent Emotional Experience 
 As with the results of univalent positive and negative emotions, the present results 
indicate that individuals with schizophrenia, in response to a mixed valence stimulus, do not 
experience notably different ambivalence relative to healthy controls. This stands in contrast to 
the only other experimental investigation of ambivalence within schizophrenia (Trémeau et al., 
2009), wherein, consistent with the early theorizing of Bleuler (1911/1950), individuals with 
schizophrenia relative to individuals without severe mental illness were found to experience 
greater ambivalent emotional experiences. There are two distinct possibilities that may account 
for these conflicting findings.  
 First, as discussed by the evaluative space model (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo 
et al., 1997) as well as previous work employing the same experimental stimulus as the present 
study (Larsen & McGraw, 2011), ambivalence is a comparatively rare phenomenon. 
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Consequently, rather than ambivalence being a common experience of individuals with 
schizophrenia, it may be that ambivalence is generally rare and only less rare within those with 
this disorder. The low base rate of ambivalent emotional experience poses a difficult challenge 
for researchers trying to avoid floor effects in experimentally inducing ambivalence to extract 
group differences and it is likely that only the most statistically powerful of methods and 
research designs will be successful in observing these differences. To this end, the schizophrenia 
sample of Trémeau and colleagues (2009) was more than double the size of that of the present 
study and this former study also included, within pictorial, aural, and lexical stimulus sets, 
multiple evocative stimuli as opposed to a single experimental stimulus. It is, therefore, possible 
that differences between the findings of the only two experimental investigations of ambivalence 
within schizophrenia are attributable to differences in methods and corresponding statistical 
power. However, assuming these methodological issues are corrected in future investigations, it 
is still worth noting that further research is needed in order to ascertain to what extent ‘less rare’ 
ambivalence would meaningfully impact the psychosocial functioning of individuals with 
schizophrenia. 
 Regarding the second possible account of the discrepant findings between the present 
study and that of Trémeau et al. (2009), the most important distinction to draw between these 
two studies pertains to the stimuli used to elicit emotional experiences and the consequent 
operational definitions of ambivalence. Specifically, ambivalence within the Trémeau and 
colleagues investigation was defined as the amount of positive emotion felt in reaction to 
negative stimuli and the amount of negative emotion felt in reaction to positive stimuli. Within 
the present study, ambivalence was defined as the amount of co-occurring positive and negative 
emotion experienced in reaction to a stimulus with intermixed positive and negative features. 
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Accordingly, disparities in stimulus sets and elicitation tasks aside, the larger conceptual 
difference between these two investigations is that the present study required participants to 
recognize ambivalence as ambivalence whereas the study by Trémeau and collaborators did not 
require participants to consciously recognize and report ambivalence. For example, within the 
Trémeau et al. study, it was theoretically possible for a given individual to report separately 
elevated positive and negative emotional experience as a result of a positive stimulus yet report 
no conscious awareness of the paradoxical nature of this emotional state. If, after perceiving the 
positive stimulus, this individual were then asked whether they were ambivalent, the individual 
would necessarily require the semantic knowledge of what it means to be ambivalent in order for 
them to label their phenomenological state and affirm the question. If the individual lacked the 
semantic or declarative knowledge of what a state of ambivalence feels like, they may then deny 
the question. Importantly, this declination would not change the emotional state upon which they 
based their self-report.  
This example illustrates a fine difference between the conceptions of ambivalence 
between the two studies and these differences correspond with divergent forms of the construct 
initially delineated by Bleuler (1911/1950). That is, Bleuler discerned three separate forms of 
ambivalence including affective, cognitive, and behavioral ambivalence (Sanislow & Carson, 
2001). Affective ambivalence occurs when a particular physical or mental object elicits 
simultaneous positive and negative feelings. Cognitive or intellectual ambivalence is more in line 
with the concept of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962) and involves the simultaneous 
holding of logically incompatible beliefs or ideas and the associated introspective confusion 
resulting from this recognized paradox. Finally, behavioral ambivalence (i.e., ‘ambivalence of 
the will’) occurs when an individual experiences simultaneous approach and avoidance or 
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otherwise contradictory motivations. It may be argued that the experimental design of Trémeau 
and colleagues (2009) examines affective ambivalence proper whereas, to the extent that 
individuals were required to operate semantic knowledge structures (i.e., label their subjective 
experiences as ambivalent) in order to report their in-the-moment emotions, the present study 
examined a more cognitive variant of ambivalence. Put plainly, then, the results of this study 
would suggest that individuals with schizophrenia do not experience inordinate cognitive 
ambivalence relative to individuals without severe mental illness however the matter of affective 
ambivalence is addressed more directly by Trémeau and colleagues. If true, this would suggest 
that the pathology in schizophrenia patients’ emotional experience occurs during earlier stages of 
emotion processing (i.e., affective ambivalence) but that this defect disappears or is masked by 
other influences at later stages of processing involving higher-order cognitions and evaluations 
(Frijda, 1999, as cited in Trémeau et al., 2009). Evidently, this possibility remains only 
speculative as the stimulus and apparatus of the present study were used with the intention of 
modeling affective ambivalence. Nevertheless, given the discrepancy between this study and that 
of Trémeau et al., it is clear that delineating subtypes of ambivalent emotional experience may be 
an important consideration for future research examining the topic of ambivalence within 
schizophrenia.  
4.5 Limitations 
 Along with notable strengths including, in particular, the use of continuous measure of 
emotional experience, there are several limitations of this study. First, the unequal distribution of 
sexes in the schizophrenia group (i.e., 23 males, four females) may have feasibility impacted, 
and limited the generalizability of, the present results. As noted above, male-dominated 
schizophrenia samples and results collapsed across sexes are unfortunate norms in schizophrenia 
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research (Kring & Moran, 2008) and, indeed, within the present analyses, sex was not found to 
statistically confound any of the dependent measures. Nevertheless, in view of the difficulties of 
truly identifying and factoring out extraneous covariance (Miller & Chapman, 2001), which is a 
salient concern for quasi-experimental designs, the underrepresentation of females with 
schizophrenia and accompanying concerns of generalizability must be acknowledged. Second, 
although defensible in light of the well-documented cognitive deficits of schizophrenia 
(Heinrichs, 2005), the reduction of the ESG to a 2 x 2 interface as opposed to using more 
continuous applications of the methodology (e.g., Larsen & McGraw, 2011) resulted in a similar 
loss of statistical power as that observed when categorizing any continuous variable. In effect, 
participants in the present study perforce reported categorical null, positive, negative, and 
ambivalent subjective emotional experience and were thus unable to directly report degrees of 
emotional experience (e.g., intensity of ambivalence). This limitation is particularly important 
given the fact that arousal – which, independent of valence, comprises the other prominent 
component of subjective emotion (Feldman-Barrett & Russell, 1999) – was largely omitted from 
the present study. It is unclear whether the inclusion of an intensity metric would indicate group 
differences in underlying emotional experience however the herein presented data are limited in 
that they only allow for speculation of this issue. Third, as noted in Footnote 7, didactic 
instruction during the training trials of the emotional experience task precluded meaningful 
analysis of any affective priming effects. The scripted experimenter instructions as well as the 
use of a uniform stimuli presentation order across participants decrease the likelihood of 
differential priming between groups. Moreover, the findings of Kring, Gard, and Gard (2011), 
suggest that any affective priming within the schizophrenia group is unlikely to be of prolonged 
duration. Nevertheless, it remains possible that, on an individual participant basis, emotion(s) 
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generated during the training phase of the emotional experience task carried over to contaminate 
or otherwise alter subjective experiences during the presentation of the experimental stimulus. 
Fourth, apart from concerns regarding the ecological validity of laboratory emotion elicitation 
stimuli generally (Droit-Volet et al., 2011), the fact that the Life is Beautiful film clip served as 
the sole experimental stimulus in the present investigation places a limit on the external validity 
of the resultant findings. Future research should utilize multiple elicitation stimuli in order to 
generalize findings across the idiosyncratic features of singular film clips and other objects used 
to elicit emotional experience. A fifth limitation of this study regards the recognized importance 
of context to subjective emotional experience (Gard & Kring, 2009). That is, although a narrative 
was provided to all participants immediately prior to the presentation of the test stimulus (see 
Appendix B) in an effort to instill a frame of reference for the ensuing emotional experiences, the 
success of this intention was never explicitly examined. It is therefore possible that this 
procedural aspect failed, in whole or in part, to contextualize the affecting features of the 
experimental stimulus for participants which thereby may have obscured their self-reported 
emotional experiences. A sixth limitation regards the nuances of employing emotional elicitation 
affective stimuli. That is, as noted by Kring and Moran (2008), it is imperative in emotion 
research to discern whether participants’ responses reflect reports of the affective properties of 
stimuli or, instead, features of their phenomenological feeling states. Given the content of the 
didactic instructions provided to all participants wherein the reporting of subjective experience 
was expressly requested, it is likely that participants reported on the affective quality of their 
experiences when navigating the ESG. However, as it is possible that at least some participants 
reported on the stimuli rather than on their emotional reactions to said stimuli, a more explicit 
inspection (e.g., asking participants to verbally report the chronology of their emotional 
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experiences post hoc) would have enabled greater certainty in this assumption. Finally, seventh, 
by collapsing across the duration of the stimulus to analyze total amounts, frequencies, and 
durations of emotional experience, potentially invaluable emotional time course data may have 
been omitted. These data may be particularly helpful in adjudicating such questions as whether 
what induces univalent or ambivalent emotional experience within those with schizophrenia are 
the same aspects of the stimulus that induce these subjective emotional experiences within non-
psychiatric individuals. Accordingly, future work should employ different data analytic strategies 
that are more sensitive to the temporal unfolding of elicited emotional experience. 
4.6 Future Directions 
 In light of the frequency of null findings reported in this study, there are several further 
directions for future research in addition to those already listed. Of note, the extensive 
heterogeneity of schizophrenic symptomatology (Tandon et al., 2009) was unaddressed in the 
preceding analyses. To the extent that any ambivalent emotional experience may co-vary with 
specific symptoms or syndromes, future research should look to evaluate more symptomatically 
homogenous subsets of individuals with schizophrenia in order to clarify whether ambivalence is 
prominent within particular groups of patients and not in others. Research in line with Research 
Domain Criteria initiatives (Sanislow et al., 2010) would obviate the strictures imposed by the 
artificialities of current psychiatric categories and is therefore more likely to provide illuminating 
insights into underlying neurobiology of emotional responding generally and ambivalence 
specifically. However, in the interim, symptom-based research would likely provide more 
immediate clinical value regarding which individuals experience significant ambivalence and 
therefore which individuals may be most responsive to certain psychosocial interventions (e.g., 
Motivational Enhancement Therapy; see Miller, 1996). Finally, an additional direction for future 
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research includes the use of eye-tracking technology and other indices of emotional experience 
that are amenable to time course analyses. Explicitly, these methods may enable greater insights 
into the etiologies of individuals’ emotional experiences by, for example, identifying those 
specific environmental objects individuals visually fixate to onset a particular emotional episode. 
4.7 Conclusions 
 Eugen Bleuler (1911/1950) both coined the term and posited the construct of 
ambivalence as a central feature of schizophrenia patients’ subjective emotional experiences of 
the world. Contrary to this contention and more recent work on the topic (Cohen & Minor, 2010; 
Trémeau et al., 2009), however, the present results suggest that schizophrenia patients’ in-the-
moment positive, negative, and ambivalent emotional experiences are not remarkably different 
from those of individuals without diagnoses of mental illness and therefore cannot rightly be 
considered abnormal. Possibilities lay in future investigations examining different subtypes of 
ambivalence and further work is needed to pin down reliable defects in schizophrenia patients’ 
state as well as trait emotional experiences. In turn, it is likely that these investigations are 
necessary in order to reconcile the observations of this study with that of Bleuler’s original 
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APPENDIX B: EVALUATIVE SPACE GRID TRAINING SCRIPT 
There are many words that can be used to describe our feelings. To get a sense of this, can you 
give me a couple of words that you might use to describe feeling positive? [Allow participant to 
generate a few examples of positive emotions – e.g., happy, glad, joyful]  
Good, now, can you give me a couple of words that you might use to describe feeling negative? 
[Allow participant to generate a few examples of negative emotions – e.g., sad, sorry, depressed]  
As you can see, there are a lot of words to describe how you feel. This can be useful because 
there are many things that can make us feel positive as well as negative. For instance, movies 
often make us feel a certain way. In a few moments, you are going to watch a clip from a movie 
for about 10 minutes. While you are watching this clip, I want you to report how it makes you 
feel. One way to report your feelings about this clip is in terms of how positive and negative it 
makes you feel. You can do this using these four squares [Open grid by clicking on “Start 
Experiment” button].  
Notice that this square [use the track pad as well as an ostensive point to direct the participant’s 
attention to the square comprising the bottom-left quadrant] is labeled ‘NONE’. While you are 
watching the movie, I want you to select this square anytime the clip does not make you feel 
either positive or negative emotions. For example, you would select this square if the movie does 
not make you feel either happy or sad. You select this square by sliding and holding your finger 
so that this square turns blue [demonstrate for participant by using the track pad]. 
Now look at this square [use the track pad as well as an ostensive point to direct the participant’s 
attention to the square comprising the bottom-right quadrant]. Notice that this square is labeled 
‘HAPPY’. I want you to select this square anytime the movie makes you feel positive emotions. 
For example, if you were watching the movie and began to feel happy or glad then you would 
select this square. You select this square by sliding and holding your finger so that this square 
turns blue [demonstrate for participant by using the track pad]. 
Now look at this square [use the track pad as well as an ostensive point to direct the participant’s 
attention to the square comprising the top-left quadrant]. Notice that this square is labeled 
‘SAD’. I want you to select this square anytime the movie makes you feel negative emotions. For 
example, if you were watching the movie and began to feel sad or distressed then you would 
select this square. You select this square by sliding and holding your finger so that this square 
turns blue [demonstrate for participant by using the track pad]. 
Lastly, look at this square [use the track pad as well as an ostensive point to direct the 
participant’s attention to the square comprising the top-right quadrant]. Notice that this square 
does not have a label. We are going to call this square the ‘BOTH’ square. Remember, this is 
very important, even though this square is not labeled, it is the ‘BOTH’ square. I want you to 
select this square anytime the movie makes you feel both positive and negative emotions at the 
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same time. For example, if you were watching the movie and began to feel happy but also sad 
then you would select this square. You select this ‘BOTH’ square by sliding and holding your 
finger so that this square turns blue [demonstrate for participant by using the track pad]. 
Before we start, let’s get some practice. We are going to watch some sample movie clips and I 
want you to select the square that best represents how the clip makes you feel. Remember, to 
select a square you slide and hold your finger so that the correct square turns blue.  
[*Ensure “Subject ID Number”, and “Save Data to” fields are correct.* Load H.wmv and start 
program. Adjust sound if necessary and allow participant to respond to clip]  
1. How did this clip make you feel? [Allow participant to answer]. This clip was pretty happy. 
Which square did you select to indicate that the movie made you feel happy or positive [or use 
participant’s words]? [Allow participant to select ‘HAPPY’ square on paper grid] 
• [If participant selects the correct square, provide oral feedback and proceed to the next 
comprehension probe] Good work! 
• [If participant selects the incorrect square, assert correction with ostensive point to 
correct square and provide oral redress] Remember, if watching a part of the movie clip 
makes you feel happy or glad, then you should select the ‘HAPPY’ square. [Allow 
participant to make correction then provide oral feedback and proceed to the next 
comprehension probe] 
 
Let’s try another practice. [*Ensure “Subject ID Number”, and “Save Data to” fields are 
correct.* Load S.wmv and start program. Adjust sound if necessary and allow participant to 
respond to clip] 
2. How did this clip make you feel? [Allow participant to answer]. This clip was pretty sad. 
Which square did you select to indicate that the movie made you feel sad or negative [or use 
participant’s words]? [Allow participant to select ‘SAD’ square on paper grid] 
• [If participant selects the correct square, provide oral feedback and proceed to the next 
comprehension probe] Good work! 
• [If participant selects the incorrect square, assert correction with ostensive point to 
correct square and provide oral redress] Remember, if watching a part of the movie clip 
makes you feel sad or negative, then you should select the ‘SAD’ square. [Allow 
participant to make correction then provide oral feedback and proceed to the next 
comprehension probe] 
 
Let’s try another practice. [*Ensure “Subject ID Number”, and “Save Data to” fields are 
correct.* Load N.wmv and start program. Adjust sound if necessary and allow participant to 
respond to clip] 
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3. How did this clip make you feel? [Allow participant to answer]. This clip was neutral. Which 
square did you select to indicate that the movie did not make you feel any emotions [or use 
participant’s words]? [Allow participant to select ‘NONE’ square on paper grid] 
• [If participant selects the correct square, provide oral feedback and proceed to the next 
comprehension probe] Good work! 
• [If participant selects the incorrect square, assert correction with ostensive point to 
correct square and provide oral redress] Remember, if watching a part of the movie clip 
does not make you feel any emotions, then you should select the ‘NONE’ square. [Allow 
participant to make correction then provide oral feedback and proceed to the next 
comprehension probe] 
 
Let’s try one last practice. [*Ensure “Subject ID Number”, and “Save Data to” fields are 
correct.* Load A.wmv and start program. Adjust sound if necessary and allow participant to 
respond to clip] 
4. How did this clip make you feel? [Allow participant to answer]. This clip might have made 
you feel both happy and sad at the same time. Which square did you select to indicate that the 
movie made you feel both positive and negative emotions [or use participant’s words] at the 
same time? [Allow participant to select ‘BOTH’ square on paper grid] 
• [If participant selects the correct square, provide oral feedback and proceed to the final 
instructions] Good work! 
• [If participant selects the incorrect square, assert correction with ostensive point to 
correct square and provide oral redress] Remember, this is the ‘BOTH’ square and if 
watching a part of the movie clip makes you feel both positive and negative emotions at 
the same time, then you should select the ‘BOTH’ square. [Allow participant to make 
correction then provide oral feedback and proceed to the final instructions] 
 
We are about to start, but before we do I want to set the scene for the clip you are about to watch. 
This movie is set in Nazi Germany during World War II. Of the many horrible things that took 
place during this time, one of the worst was that many families were broken apart. People were 
taken from their loved ones and imprisoned in concentration camps where they faced slavery and 
the constant threat of death. Despite this horrific reality facing many of those who experienced 
these camps, some people persevered and lived remarkable lives. 
Okay, before we start do you have any questions? [Answer any questions the participant may 
have]. 
Please keep in mind that it is important to maintain your focus on the movie clip as well as how 
it makes you feel for the full time that the movie is being shown. How you feel as you watch the 
film may change throughout the clip and so it is important that you continue to update how you 
feel by selecting the appropriate square. Remember, focus on the movie clip and how it makes 
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you feel and select the square that most accurately characterizes your feelings at that time. 
Ready? 
[*Ensure “Subject ID Number”, and “Save Data to” fields are correct.* Load TEST.wmv and 
start program. Adjust sound if necessary and allow participant to respond to clip] 
[If you notice that the participant is being inattentive, provide the following directive] 
Remember, focus on the movie clip and how it makes you feel and select the square that most 
accurately characterizes your feelings. 
[If you notice that the participant is perseverating in one square, provide the following directive] 
Remember, how you feel may change throughout the clip and so it’s important that you update 
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